

**TERRORISM:
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE HOME FRONT**

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Editor**

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FOREWORD

The recent bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma has highlighted the complexity of the phenomenon of political extremism. Until this occurred, inside the United States *foreign* terrorists were the focus of attention, particularly the so-called Islamic fundamentalists. Undue emphasis on the “foreign connection” can make it appear that only Middle Eastern terror is of consequence.

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has long resisted this approach. We view terrorism as a universal phenomenon, one that can erupt anywhere. As part of our continuing investigation of this problem, SSI held a conference last November at Georgia Tech, at which a number of terrorist-related issues were considered. The emphasis was on international terror, but the threat of domestic extremism also was examined. Included in this volume are three papers presented at the conference—two are related to international terror, while one is concerned with the domestic variety—and a concluding chapter.

In the first chapter, Dr. Kenneth Katzman, an analyst with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, uncovers important facts about Hizbollah, considered by many the most lethal of the Islamic fundamentalist groups. Based on his findings, Dr. Katzman ventures to predict what the group’s likely future course of action will be.

Dr. Lew Ware’s contribution in the second chapter is equally important. A professor of Mid-East studies at the Air Command and Staff College, he has painstakingly, and with impressive scholarship, detailed the differences between Sunni and Shia ideas of *jihad*, a concept crucial to understanding a range of Middle Eastern fundamentalist organizations. Analysts who are less serious than Dr. Ware profess to see no difference between the Shias and Sunnis on this point. However, as Dr. Ware shows, a world of difference exists on this and other matters relating to the fundamentalists’ *modus operandi*.

In the third chapter, Dr. Stephen Sloan, Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, has, with remarkable prescience, focused on the likelihood of domestic terror groups escalating their activities inside the United States, and he speculates about the various manifestations that could develop.

Finally, Dr. Steven Metz, Associate Research Professor at SSI, completes the volume with an essay on America’s role in world affairs, and how this makes the nation a prey to acts of terror by international and domestic actors.

SSI is pleased to offer this monograph as an aid to understanding this perplexing subject.

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CHAPTER 1

HIZBOLLAH: NARROWING OPTIONS IN LEBANON¹

Kenneth Katzman

Introduction.

Hizbollah is under pressure. One of the keys to its survival thus far has been the alliance between its two outside patrons, Iran and Syria. Its primary patron, Iran, opposes an Arab- Israeli peace settlement. Syria, on the other hand, is moving toward peace with Israel, a peace that will likely include guarantees that Hizbollah be subject to significant constraints. As a result, Hizbollah is seeking to play a larger role in the legitimate Lebanese political process to hedge its bets against what Hizbollah may see as likely further limitations on its regional influence in a future peace agreement between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. Meanwhile, Hizbollah hardliners do not accept change in the Middle East and they are increasingly resorting to international terrorism against Israeli and Jewish targets to try to avenge Israeli attacks and to derail the peace process. Hizbollah also appears to believe that the buildup of its terrorist cells overseas might enable the military wing of the organization to survive offshore in case the militia is dismantled in Lebanon as part of an Israeli/Syrian/Lebanese peace settlement.²

Hizbollah's tactics and strategies are evolving, but it is still remembered for spectacular acts of terrorism against the United States and the West during the 1980s. In its annual report on international terrorism for 1993, the State Department describes Hizbollah as a "radical Shia Muslim group formed in Lebanon, dedicated to the creation of an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and removal of all non-Islamic influences from [the] area. [It is] strongly anti-West and anti-Israel [and] closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran."³ The report adds that Hizbollah is "known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, including the suicide bombings of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut (April and October 1983, respectively) and the U.S. Embassy annex in September 1984. The group also hijacked TWA Flight 847 in 1985. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of most, if not all, U.S. and other Western hostages in Lebanon. Islamic Jihad [another name used by Hizbollah elements] publicly claimed responsibility for the car-bombing of Israel's Embassy in Buenos Aires in March 1992,⁴ and it is believed responsible for bombings of Israeli and Jewish installations in Buenos Aires and London in July 1994.

In part to mask its responsibility for certain actions, Hizbollah elements sometimes act under a variety of names, possibly corresponding to different cells or clans within the organization, including: Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine. Hizbollah's military operations are carried out under the name Islamic Resistance. A Hizbollah branch that claimed responsibility for the July 18, 1994 bombing of a Jewish services building in Buenos Aires calls itself Ansarallah (partisans of God).

Hizbollah's Formation.

A number of factors accounted for Hizbollah's emergence in 1982. First and foremost, Lebanon provided fertile ground for Shia political action. Lebanon's Shia Muslims—who comprise Hizbollah—have been underrepresented in the Lebanese power structure and, possibly as a consequence, economically downtrodden. These conditions created Shia resentment, particularly toward the economically and politically dominant Christian community. In addition, the civil war that began in 1975 and pitted virtually all of Lebanon's factions against each other at one time or another left the Lebanese government with very little authority.⁵ Power was primarily in the hands of militias linked to the factions that split Lebanon along ethnic, religious, familial, and regional lines.

Second, there were a number of Shia clerics in Lebanon who were enamored of Iran's Islamic revolution. Many of the clerics that ultimately formed Hizbollah had studied under either Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, when he was in exile in Najaf, Iraq, in the 1970s, or his colleague Muhammad Baqr Al Sadr, who was executed by Saddam Hussein's regime in 1980. Abbas Musawi and Subhi Tufayli, both former leaders of Hizbollah, reportedly studied there at that time. The current leader, Hasan Nasrallah, visited Khomeini when he was teaching in Najaf. (Khomeini began teaching in Najaf, which is sacred to Shias worldwide, when the Shah of Iran exiled him from Iran in 1964.) Hizbollah cleric Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah helped found the Da'wa (Islamic Call), a forerunner of Hizbollah, when he was a student of Muhammad Baqr Al Sadr and Ayatollah Abol Qasim Musavi-Khoi in Najaf in the 1960s. Fadlallah brought the Da'wa to Lebanon, or according to other accounts, supported Da'wa's establishment there in the mid 1960s.⁶ This mentor-student relationship—a crucial element in the Shia clerical hierarchy—in large part forms the emotional bond between Hizbollah's clerics and Iran. However, there are occasional strains between Iran and Hizbollah over specific tactics and Iranian financial support, as well as cultural differences between Arab Hizbollah and Persian Iran.

Third, the building blocks of the Hizbollah organization were present even before the 1982 Israeli invasion. There had already been growing Islamic awareness among Lebanese Shias, encapsulated in such movements as the leftwing "Movement of the Disinherited," and its military offshoot, Amal (hope) founded by Iranian-born Sayyid Musa Sadr in 1975. (Musa Sadr disappeared on a visit to Libya in 1978, and he was believed killed by the Libyans. This was an early source of contention between the Islamic Republic and Libya.) Hizbollah drew many of its recruits from Amal, including the followers of radical non-clerics Hussein Musawi and Mustafa Dirani. In addition, prior to its invasion of Lebanon, Israel had established contact with Shia leaders in southern Lebanon in an attempt to create an anti-Palestinian ally there and the Shiites in southern Lebanon initially welcomed the 1982 Israeli invasion, hoping it would cleanse the Palestinian forces from there.⁷ However, many of these Shias turned on Israel after its invasion and occupation and later joined Hizbollah.

The June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, a response to attacks on northern Israel by Palestinian fighters, was the trigger event in Hizbollah's formation as a party. The invasion provoked Iran, with Syrian approval, to send a contingent of about 1,000 Revolutionary Guards to Baalbek in eastern Lebanon, ostensibly to combat the Israelis.⁸ However, along with fighting Israeli forces about 35 miles south of their position, the Guards began propagating Iran's Islamic revolution among the Shia community and began running social welfare programs, schools, and hospitals.⁹ Gradually, the Guards and hardline Iranian clerics, most notably then-Ambassador to Syria Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, promoted the coalescence of the radical Lebanese Shia clerics and non-clerical militants who, by late 1982, were referring to themselves as Hizbollah, the Arabic word for Party of God. Each cleric who joined Hizbollah brought large parts of his congregation into Hizbollah's militia; significant numbers of additional recruits were attracted by Hizbollah propaganda, sermons, and seminars.¹⁰ It offered to these recruits a vision of an Islamic Lebanon within a broader Islamic revolution, catering to the economically deprived.

Hizbollah's Organizational Structure and Operations.

The organizational structure of Hizbollah—both its political and military wings—is fluid and flexible. This flexibility has enabled Hizbollah to survive challenges from other militias, from Israel, and sometimes from Syria. Hizbollah's flexibility will likely be the key to its survival if there is a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. Hizbollah's organization traditionally has been based on the personal authority and following of its clerical leaders and its militia commanders, linked by a common ideology and background. In addition, clans and families have dominated large factions within Hizbollah. In the late 1980s, however, Hizbollah attempted to become more centralized and structured. It formed an overarching consultative council—subordinate to the Secretary-General and deputy Secretary General—and three regional councils corresponding to its areas of greatest influence in Lebanon: the Bekaa Valley (the base of most of Hizbollah's senior clerics), the southern suburbs of Beirut (to which many Shias migrated during the 1975-90 civil war), and the traditional Shia villages in southern Lebanon. Hasan Nasrallah comes from southern Lebanon, but he served as Hizbollah's chief mobilization officer in the Bekaa, enabling him to expand his political base there. Decisions of the consultative council are implemented by a Political Bureau, which is chosen by an electoral body of delegates that meets in a congress about every four years. A separate executive committee oversees the regional commands and several administrative departments, such as social affairs, finance, trade union affairs, education, health, and information.¹¹ Hizbollah also established a screening system for its militia recruits, probably to prevent penetration by Israeli, Syrian, and Lebanese government agents.¹² According to Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbollah's decisions are by a majority vote of the recognized leaders of Hizbollah, but on major decisions Hizbollah leaders usually try to achieve a consensus. Some observers believe that, in hesitating to discuss its organization, Hizbollah leaders are trying to mask a high degree of factionalization.

One of Hizbollah's most important strengths has been its ability to deliver social services when and where the Lebanese government could not. This social service

network not only made Hizbollah popular among Lebanese Shias, but it also helped it attract recruits and take away support from its chief rival for Shia loyalties, Amal, which does not enjoy financial support from Iran. Hizbollah's strong social services network will probably help Hizbollah remain popular even if Hizbollah's militia is disarmed in connection with a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. In Beirut's southern suburbs and other Hizbollah strongholds, Hizbollah has provided clean water, hospitals, and subsidized medical clinics. It also runs schools reportedly staffed by well-qualified teachers, sells food at discount supermarkets, and rebuilds damaged homes for poor Lebanese.¹³ During a snowstorm in the winter of 1991-92, Hizbollah organized teams of relief workers to open roads and distribute food and other provisions to villages cut off in the storm.¹⁴ Hizbollah also has a reconstruction arm, the Holy Struggle for Reconstruction, that financed repairs of over 1,000 homes in south Lebanon following an Israeli offensive into two Shia areas north of the security zone villages in February 1992.¹⁵ Moreover, Hizbollah activists often have tried, sometimes through violence, to interfere with other businesses it considers "un-Islamic." However, Hizbollah reportedly is less strict in its enforcement of Islamic values in areas under its control than was the case a few years ago. Lebanese officials say that, as the Lebanese government rebuilds Lebanon, it hopes to take over the performance of these traditional governmental services from Hizbollah.

Hizbollah's social net enabled it to win "hearts and minds" among the Shia population of Lebanon. However, to flourish in Lebanese politics and to combat Israel it placed significant weight on developing a strong military arm. The State Department's 1993 report on international terrorism lists Hizbollah's "strength" at several thousand.

Hizbollah sources assert that the organization has about 5,000-10,000 fighters.¹⁶ Other sources believe that Hizbollah's militia consists of a hard core of about 300-400 fighters, which can be expanded to up to 3,000 within several hours as a battle with Israel develops.¹⁷ These reserves presumably are called in from other Hizbollah strongholds in Lebanon, including the Bekaa Valley and Beirut's southern suburbs. (Hizbollah's main military bases are in the Bekaa Valley, where they are protected by Syrian air cover.)

Hizbollah fighters tend to operate in dispersed, small units in order to avoid becoming a concentrated target, in contrast to the Palestinian forces that operated in southern Lebanon during the 1970s and early 1980s. The Hizbollah units use information and support from the local Shia population. Over the past few years, Hizbollah fighters in south Lebanon have pioneered new tactics, infiltrating into Israel's security zone and waiting in ambush for days to hit Israeli patrols from long range. Support units nearby then hit Israeli strongpoints with mortars as its infiltration units escape the zone.¹⁸ Israeli military officials believe the new tactics have made Hizbollah a much more formidable force than it was in the mid-1980s, when it emphasized suicide bombings and other highly unconventional tactics.

However, it should be noted that Hizbollah's operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon during the Israeli occupation contributed to Israel's decision in early 1985 to withdraw from Lebanon and to accelerate the withdrawal once it had begun. Hizbollah, as well as Amal, conducted car, truck, and remote detonation bombings against Israeli forces during their occupation of parts of Lebanon (1982-85), killing many Israeli

soldiers.¹⁹ Hizbollah, as well as other Lebanese and Palestinians, continued to attack Israeli forces in the southern “security zone” after Israel withdrew in 1985 from all areas north of the zone. The security zone is inhabited largely by Lebanese Shias. As Hizbollah became more organized and well trained in the post-withdrawal period, its attacks on the South Lebanese Army (SLA) (a pro-Israeli militia led by Brigadier General Antoine Lahad) increasingly took on a more conventional form, and the use of suicide attacks decreased.

Hizbollah’s militia is still predominantly a light force. It is equipped primarily with small arms, such as automatic rifles, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and Katyusha rockets, which it occasionally has fired on towns in northern Israel. U.S. officials say it does not have truck-mounted multiple launch systems for the Katyushas, however.

Hizbollah guerrillas are sometimes shown on television conducting military parades in Beirut, which often include tanks and armored personnel carriers that may have been captured from the Lebanese army or purchased from Palestinian guerrillas or other sources. Hizbollah has also frequently used remotely detonated bombs against Israeli or SLA patrols in Israel’s “security zone” in southern Lebanon. According to State Department counter- terrorism officials, Hizbollah also has short-range anti-tank weapons, including the Sagger. Beirut television sometimes shows film of Hizbollah Saggers homing in on Israeli vehicles. U.S. officials add that there is an assumption that Hizbollah also has some Russian-made shoulder held anti-aircraft missiles such as the heat-seeking SAM-7 (Strela), but there is no record of Hizbollah shooting down Israeli aircraft.

Hizbollah is not known to possess such sophisticated weapons as Stinger anti-aircraft missile launchers, but its patron, Iran, is believed to possess some and is reportedly attempting to acquire additional Stingers in Afghanistan.²⁰ Iran might, at some point if not already, give Stingers to Hizbollah. One report in October 1994, quoting a Hizbollah militia commander, suggested Iran was training Hizbollah fighters, at a base outside Tehran, in the use of Stingers and Scud-like surface-to-surface missiles.²¹ It is reasonable to assume that, whether in Iran, Sudan, or somewhere else in the Middle East, Iran is training Hizbollah pilots to fly combat aircraft. However, even if this training were taking place, it is not clear how or from where Hizbollah could operate an air arm in Lebanon, even if it were allowed to do so by Syria.

Hizbollah has used its military wing not only to fight Israel, but also to make it a major force within Lebanon. After rapid growth in size and influence during the early 1980s, in 1987 Hizbollah became embroiled in a violent political struggle for supremacy among Lebanese Shias. Its adversary in that struggle was the secular Amal militia, which has enjoyed the strong backing of Syria and is generally better armed than Hizbollah.²² Hizbollah’s revolutionary and Islamic ideology enabled it to siphon many recruits and some leaders from the more pragmatic Amal, which has been less willing to fight Israel in southern Lebanon. For example, Hussein Musawi, the leader of the Islamic Amal faction of Hizbollah, broke away from Amal in favor of Hizbollah in 1983, after Amal, in 1982, decided to enter the Lebanese National Salvation Authority, a coalition regime that included representatives from all of Lebanon’s major religions and

sects.²³ The tensions between Hizbollah and Amal manifested themselves as violent clashes during 1988-90, in which Amal defeated Hizbollah in Amal's traditional stronghold in southern Lebanon but Hizbollah wrested from Amal control of the largely Shia southern suburbs of Beirut. Amal reportedly initiated the fighting in 1988 in an effort to solidify its base in Lebanon's Shia community in advance of anticipated 1988 elections (not held).²⁴ Hizbollah was allowed to return to southern Lebanon under an Iranian-brokered ceasefire of January 30, 1989. There have been some clashes between the two forces since that time, primarily in early 1990 and again in April 1990, but Amal and Hizbollah began cooperating in June 1992 to contest Lebanese parliamentary elections.

Efforts to Disrupt the Peace Process. The latest phase of operations against Israel began following the start of Middle East peace talks in October 1991, and appears intended, at least partly, to derail the peace process. Hizbollah knows that a peace between Israel and Syria and Lebanon will require its dismantlement as a militia. To head off this result, Hizbollah, backed by Iran, has sought to prevent—or at least forestall—any peace agreement among these parties. It can be argued that Iranian opposition to the peace process stems not only from Iran's ideology, but from a real political desire not to see its prime offspring, Hizbollah, eliminated.

Hizbollah has tried to disrupt the peace process by provoking clashes with Israel that Hizbollah hoped would bring Israel into conflict with Syria and Lebanon. The most violent round of clashes since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon took place in July 1993, after Hizbollah attacks against Israeli and SLA forces in the security zone killed six Israeli soldiers within two weeks in mid-July. (Hizbollah attacks killed 3 Israeli soldiers on July 8 and another on July 22; its *de facto* ally, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command [PFLP-GC], killed two Israeli soldiers on July 8.) The Hizbollah attacks occurred shortly before U.S. Secretary of State Christopher was to visit the Middle East in an effort to organize an eleventh round in the Middle East peace talks.²⁵ In response to the Hizbollah attacks, Israel, on July 25, 1993, launched a series of large-scale air, naval, and artillery attacks on Hizbollah and PFLP-GC positions in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, termed "Operation Accountability." Syria apparently was sufficiently committed to the peace process that it did not retaliate against Israel directly. As the Israeli offensive began, Hizbollah launched Katyusha rockets on towns in northern Israel, such as Qiryat Shemona. Israel subsequently began striking Hizbollah positions in civilian areas in southern Lebanon in an effort to pressure Syria and Lebanon to curb Hizbollah by creating a flood of about 300,000 refugees.²⁶ (Hizbollah has often established positions in civilian areas in an effort to discourage retaliation.) In response, Hizbollah expanded its rocket attacks on northern Israel.

The escalating violence—and threats of an Israeli ground invasion into Lebanon that would almost certainly have suspended the peace process for a significant period—may have contributed to a decision by the United States to mediate a ceasefire. U.S. mediation largely ended the fighting by July 31 (a few days before Secretary of State Christopher's arrival in the region); Hizbollah reportedly pledged not to attack Israeli towns but did not agree to discontinue operations against Israel and the SLA in the

security zone.²⁷ The Administration, as well as Israel, praised Syria for helping arrange the ceasefire.²⁸ On August 19, 1993, however, Hizbollah detonated three remote control bombs in the security zone, resulting in the death of nine Israeli soldiers. Probably to avoid another prolonged round of fighting that could derail the Arab-Israeli peace process and/or its private negotiations with the PLO, Israeli retaliation was limited.

Following the ceasefire, about 300 Lebanese troops moved into southern Lebanon, presumably to rein in Hizbollah attacks on Israel. Lebanon reportedly wanted to deploy more than the largely symbolic 300 troops but Damascus reportedly pressured Beirut to scale back the deployment.²⁹ Syria was said to fear that the Lebanese deployment could lead to fighting between Lebanese soldiers and Hizbollah, legitimize Israeli demands for security guarantees with Lebanon and, possibly, lead the United Nations to conclude that its peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon was no longer necessary.³⁰ The Lebanese government, reportedly at the behest of Syria, said its troops would not attempt to disarm Hizbollah or take over its positions. The United Nations allowed the Lebanese army to deploy in southern Lebanon alongside units of the 5,900 man U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a peacekeeping force.³¹ (UNIFIL, which is to maintain strict neutrality among warring parties, had previously opposed maintaining joint checkpoints with the Lebanese army in southern Lebanese villages.)

Sporadic, small clashes continued after that time, flaring up again in the summer of 1994. On May 21, 1994, Israel abducted a Hizbollah faction leader, Mustafa Dirani, who is said to have information about downed Israeli pilot Ron Arad. On June 2, 1994, Israel killed about 25 young Hizbollah fighters in an attack on Hizbollah's main training base in the Bekaa Valley. Hizbollah vowed retaliation for these two actions, which it apparently took in the form of overseas terrorism against Israeli and Jewish targets in July 1994 (see below), before and after the July 25, 1994, summit in Washington between Jordan's King Hussein and Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Fighting between Hizbollah and Israel, apparently also intended to cloud the Israeli-Jordanian summit in Washington, flared in July and early August, including Hizbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel. During Secretary of State Christopher's early August 1994 visit to the region to narrow Syrian-Israeli differences on the peace process, the United States publicly praised Syria for its role in calming the fighting.

Hizbollah has also supported radical Palestinian groups opposed to peace, apparently as part of an effort to obstruct the Arab-Israeli peace process. Hizbollah and the radical Palestinian groups are united by their opposition to any territorial compromise with Israel and by their fears that a successful peace agreement will weaken them politically. The Palestinian uprising on the West Bank and Gaza strip, which began in late 1987, created an opportunity for Hizbollah to develop *de facto* alliances with like-minded Palestinian groups. Hizbollah held conferences and rallies in Lebanon in support of the uprising, and it built ties to a Palestinian Islamic group called Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot that originated among militant Palestinian fundamentalists in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s. (Not to be confused with Islamic Jihad, which is one of the names used by Hizbollah activists in terrorist operations).³² The uprising also helped spawn another militant Palestinian Islamic group, Hamas, with which Hizbollah and Iran

are also reported to have developed strong ties.³³ Hamas, also an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, has become the major rival to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) among Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad reject the Arab-Israeli peace talks, but some Hamas leaders are believed to be open to joining the Palestinian authority; Palestinian Islamic Jihad rejects the authority. In recent years, Hizbollah also has expanded its ties to a secular Palestinian radical group, the PFLP-GC, headed by Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian army. Fighters from the PFLP-GC and other radical Palestinian groups fought alongside Hizbollah in the July 1993 clashes with Israel in southern Lebanon.

Hizbollah and representatives of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the PFLP-GC expressed rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process at a conference hosted by Iran, held on the eve of the October 30, 1991 Madrid Middle East peace conference. Hizbollah also has called on radical Palestinian groups to aggressively oppose the September 13, 1993 Israel-PLO agreement and, the day of the signing, Hizbollah and its Palestinian allies demonstrated in Beirut against the agreement. When Hamas militants kidnapped Israeli soldier Nachshon Waxman in October 1994, they demanded that Israel release not only Palestinian Islamists but also abducted Hizbollah figures Mustafa Dirani and Abd al-Qarim Ubayd, a radical Hizbollah cleric from Jibshit.³⁴ Even the combined efforts of Hizbollah and Palestinian rejectionists have been unable thus far to derail the peace process, although progress in the Syrian/Lebanese/Israeli track appears to be very slow.

International Terrorism. Hizbollah's involvement in international terrorism is not new to the organization, although its use of terrorism might also help Hizbollah ensure its own survival. Recent Hizbollah terrorism has reportedly been orchestrated by hardliners within Hizbollah, including Subhi Tufayli and former hostage holder (in Lebanon) Imad Mughniyah, who has been living in Tehran for the past two years.³⁵ The hardliners appear to believe they might still be able to derail an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement and they apparently are not concerned that Hizbollah-orchestrated terrorism will strengthen Israel's insistence that Hizbollah be curbed in any Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian peace agreement. The hardliners, backed by a broader constituency within Hizbollah, appear to believe that expanding the organization's terrorist infrastructure abroad—to such places as Sudan, Europe, and Latin America—can hedge against any peace settlement that mandates Hizbollah's dismantlement.³⁶ In essence, Hizbollah may be moving its militia overseas, preserving the possibility that the militia could one day be reconstituted in Lebanon if the peace process fails. At the very least, Hizbollah cells are positioned to strike at Israeli and Jewish targets in an increasing number of regions abroad.³⁷ Hizbollah's militiamen can join existing Hizbollah cells abroad, conducting international terrorism, while waiting for an opportune time to return to Lebanon.

Recent acts of Hizbollah terrorism have been directed at Israeli and Jewish targets as revenge for Israeli attacks on Hizbollah. There have been no new hostage takings or hijackings against the United States and its European allies over the past two years. The latest round of Hizbollah terrorist activities began as retaliation for the February 16, 1992, Israeli helicopter attack on Hizbollah positions, which resulted in the death of

Hizbollah leader Abbas Musawi and members of his family. (Israel did not deny that the attack on Musawi was premeditated.) On March 17, 1992, Hizbollah responded by planting a bomb at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 and wounding 242.³⁸ Hizbollah claimed responsibility for the attack under the name Islamic Jihad. In July 1994, Hizbollah was allegedly responsible for bombing Jewish and Israeli installations in Buenos Aires and London, most likely in retaliation for Israel's June 2, 1994, attack on a Hizbollah base (over 20 Hizbollah fighters were killed) and Israel's abduction on May 21, 1994, of Hizbollah faction leader Mustafa Dirani. However, the terrorist attacks—as well as clashes with Israeli and Israeli proxy forces in southern Lebanon—came just before and just after the summit in Washington between King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin, and prior to visits by Secretary of State Christopher to the Middle East to advance the Israeli-Syrian peace process. This suggests that Hizbollah is timing its acts of vengeance to adversely affect the Middle East peace process.

Hizbollah's worldwide expansion means that the radical elements of the organization might live on even if Hizbollah's militia is dismantled in Lebanon. Hizbollah's ability to conduct the bombings of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the Jewish-Argentine Mutual Association (1994) demonstrates a presence in South America, far from Lebanon. The State Department listed Sudan's harboring of Hizbollah—as well as several other groups—as a reason for placing Sudan on the "terrorism list" on August 18, 1993.³⁹ Sudan would be ideal for harboring several hundred Hizbollah militiamen if Hizbollah's military arm in Lebanon is curbed. There have also been allegations that Hizbollah is building a network of support in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and has established at least one cell in Canada.⁴⁰ Hizbollah cells also have appeared in Somalia and Bosnia.⁴¹ In 1989, Spanish police uncovered a Hizbollah cell in that country, and African authorities reportedly have seen evidence of Hizbollah activity in Zaire, Gabon, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast.⁴² Available evidence suggests that Hizbollah cells abroad are aided and abetted by Iranian diplomats who can use diplomatic immunity to assist Hizbollah operations overseas. Many of those Iranian diplomats most helpful to Hizbollah have turned out to be participants in the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.⁴³ These Iranians are posted abroad for the chief purpose of promoting international terrorism, tracking Iran's opponents abroad, or recruiting Islamic militants to participate in Iranian efforts to export Islamic revolution throughout the Muslim world.

Ideology and Evolving Tactics.

Hizbollah's leaders have always viewed Lebanon as an artificial creation of the West and they still apparently want to see it become a purely Islamic republic within a greater Islamic state that would encompass the whole region, including Israel. Even though the creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon was not included in Hizbollah's manifesto,⁴⁴ Hizbollah leaders, at least publicly, continue to see the creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon as a step in promoting the formation of a greater Islamic state. They argue that Lebanon is too small and politically and militarily weak to form an Islamic republic that could stand by itself. Hizbollah rejected the provisions for political reform contained in the 1989 Ta'if Accords, primarily because the accords included a commitment to

disarmament of Lebanon's militias, of which Hizbollah is one, and did not contain what it considered sufficient political concessions to the Shia community.⁴⁵ However, Hizbollah supported the accords' references to U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 of March 19, 1978, which called for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. (About 1,000 Israeli troops, in cooperation with the 2,000 -3,000 man SLA, have maintained a 5-10 miles deep and about 50 miles long "security zone" along the Lebanese-Israeli border since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. See Figure 1.)

After twelve years of combat against Israel, Israel's proxy forces, and other groups in Lebanon, Hizbollah is showing signs of compromise, at least in its tactics. Hizbollah appears to realize that its military operations, including the taking of hostages and bombings abroad, have not made Lebanon an Islamic republic, eliminated the State of Israel from the region, or cleansed Israeli patrols and proxy forces from southern Lebanon. Hizbollah is probably frustrated that it has not yet been able to end the Arab-Israeli peace process, even though attacks by it and by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have slowed progress toward peace considerably. Hizbollah probably recognizes that it must retain the option of carving out a role for itself in a more peaceful Middle East, or its survival as an organization will be threatened. If it does not survive, Hizbollah will be unable to pursue its more maximalist goals at a more politically opportune time –i.e., if the peace process be reversed. Therefore, Hizbollah is cultivating an alternate source of power in the legitimate political system. In 1992, it decided to participate, for the first time, in parliamentary elections which were held that September. An alternate interpretation is that Hizbollah's electoral participation does not represent compromise, but rather a belief that Hizbollah's gaining a greater share of legitimate political power will strengthen its efforts to form an Islamic republic in Lebanon and to purge Western influence from the region. In addition to running candidates in the 1992 elections, Hizbollah has also begun a political dialogue with Lebanese Christian leaders; such a dialogue with those whom Hizbollah had previously denounced as U.S./Israeli puppets was anathema as late as a few years ago.

The decision to participate in the 1992 elections was a difficult one for Hizbollah, despite its cogent rationale. The former Secretary General of Hizbollah, Subhi Tufayli, opposed Hizbollah's participating in the elections as a sellout of its ideology. The Lebanese press reported that Tufayli's position had substantial support among rank and file Hizbollah members.⁴⁶ Acknowledging that the decision was a departure for Hizbollah, its leader, Hasan Nasrallah, explained the goals of that decision as stiffening political and moral support in Lebanon for Hizbollah's "resistance" against Israel; ending Lebanon's participation in the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace talks (begun October 30, 1991) and voting down any agreement under those talks that might require parliamentary approval; overturning what Nasrallah describes as political domination by Lebanon's Maronite Christians and the confessional basis of the Lebanese political system; and promoting laws that better serve the lower classes.⁴⁷ The decision to participate taken, Tufayli and other Hizbollah hardliners apparently have chosen to focus instead on continuing to battle Israel through international terrorism, and Hizbollah's militia leaders in southern Lebanon, who are close to the radical wing of Hizbollah, continue to combat Israel and its proxy forces in the Israeli security zone. The militia

commanders reportedly enjoy a certain amount of autonomy from the cleric-dominated Hizbollah party structure based in Beirut and the Bekaa Valley.⁴⁸

In the elections, Hizbollah concentrated on winning seats in its three major strongholds, forming a common slate with its erstwhile rival, Amal, in southern Lebanon under a "Liberation List." Hizbollah won heavily in the Baalbek region of the Bekaa Valley. Out of 128 seats up for election, Hizbollah won eight seats outright and its Sunni Muslim fundamentalist allies won four others, giving Hizbollah control over the largest single bloc in the new parliament. Hizbollah's strong showing can be partly attributed to the boycott of the elections by most Maronite Christians, who argued elections could not be fair because Syria maintained a presence in Beirut. However, Hizbollah's provision of social services has given Hizbollah opportunities for political patronage and made it genuinely popular among many poor Lebanese Shias. Some believe Hizbollah did commit some election fraud, although few believe it was so widespread as to have drastically affected Hizbollah's vote. According to its current leader, Hasan Nasrallah, Hizbollah's support comes mainly from younger Lebanese Shias. Hizbollah therefore wants to lower the voting age in Lebanon from 21 to 18 years of age.⁴⁹

Belying its ambivalence about entering the legitimate political process, following the elections Hizbollah continued to assert that it is an opposition element. Its spokesmen declared that Hizbollah would not accept any positions in the Lebanese government but indicated it would coordinate and cooperate with Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

(Hizbollah may also have foresworn membership in the Cabinet because it knew it would not be offered any cabinet portfolios.) Hizbollah said it would allow its four Sunni fundamentalist allies in the Chamber of Deputies (parliament) to participate in the government. Lebanese officials note that Hizbollah deputies in parliament have followed parliamentary procedure and have not been disruptive, but they continue to assert the stated goals of destroying Israel and creating an Islamic republic in Lebanon. Hizbollah deputies have become focused to some degree on local issues, such as services and infrastructure, however. Some note that because Hizbollah is based on ideology, Hizbollah deputies in parliament are less willing to engage in corrupt practices that have allegedly tainted members of Lebanon's traditional power blocs.

Hizbollah's Supporters.

Hizbollah's two major patrons are Iran and Syria, which formed an alliance in 1982 against Iraq's Saddam Hussein. With Saddam weak after his defeat in Desert Storm, the Syrian-Iranian axis may be less crucial to both parties, and the two countries diverge on the issue of peace with Israel. The possibility of peace between Israel and Syria threatens to dissolve the Syrian-Iranian entente, and a major rift between Syria and Iran would undoubtedly harm Hizbollah. Syrian officials, however, maintain that Syria's alliance with Iran is deeply rooted and would survive a Syrian peace with Israel.⁵⁰

Iran. Iran is Hizbollah's primary patron and there is an emotional and ideological bond between Hizbollah and the Islamic Republic. Iranian clerics and Revolutionary Guards played a key role in creating Hizbollah in 1982, as noted above. Like Hizbollah,

Iran has consistently called for Israel's destruction, an end to Middle East peace talks, and the purging of Western influence from the region. Hizbollah supports the doctrine of clerical rule (*velayat-e-faqih*, rule by the supreme Islamic jurisprudent) that was first espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini and forms the basis of Iran's revolutionary regime.

Hizbollah leaders consistently emphasize that Hizbollah is a part of the Islamic revolution that achieved power in Iran. At the same time, Iran has tried to ensure that the movement remains under its control. At the time Iran was trying to persuade Hizbollah to release U.S. hostages from Lebanon (1991), Iran reportedly intervened to replace the hardline Subhi Tufayli as Hizbollah leader with the somewhat more pragmatic Abbas Musawi.⁵¹

In spite of recent cutbacks in Iranian aid to Hizbollah, Iran reportedly still provides about \$60 million annually to underwrite Hizbollah activities, and it arms and trains Hizbollah through its Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebanon.⁵² Some of the Iranian funds reportedly are provided by hardliner-dominated foundations, such as the Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled, which are not directly accountable to the Iranian government.⁵³ The Guard contingent is provided logistical help through Iran's embassies in Beirut and Damascus, which have always been staffed by Iranian hardliners who sympathize with Hizbollah's goals. (According to Lebanese officials, Iranian aid to Hizbollah had been as high as \$300 million per year.⁵⁴) According to the U.S. Government, in 1992 Iran was the ninth largest arms exporter to the Third World with about \$200 million in arms exports; a sizeable part of this figure undoubtedly consisted of arms transfers to Hizbollah, and possibly to Afghanistan and Sudan.⁵⁵ A State Department official adds that Hizbollah may also purchase some weapons in the free-wheeling market for arms in Lebanon. Iran also reportedly helps fund and administer Hizbollah's social services network in Lebanon.

There are some strains between Iran and Hizbollah, but they probably are not significant enough to threaten the relationship. First and foremost, Iran's President Rafsanjani has been trying to improve Iran's relations with the West and he probably sees Hizbollah as an obstacle to that process. Rafsanjani is widely perceived as encouraging Hizbollah to concentrate on the legitimate political process, while his hardline opponents in Iran, including many in the Revolutionary Guard, apparently want Hizbollah to remain militant. In April 1991, for example, the Guard commander in Lebanon, Hadi Reza Askari, vowed that the Guard would not withdraw from Lebanon until Israel evacuated the south of that country.⁵⁶ In addition, there are cultural differences in that Iranians are Persians and Hizbollah members, although Shias, are Arabs. Some evidence of strain was provided by Iran's refusal to provide significant additional funds to Hizbollah for repair of damage to its infrastructure in south Lebanon following the July 1993 clashes, as well as other cutbacks that began in late 1992.⁵⁷

Iranian leaders reportedly told Hizbollah to raise the funds privately,⁵⁸ probably by seeking donations from hardliner-dominated Iranian foundations. The rebuff may have indicated that Iran wants Hizbollah to be more self-sufficient financially, given a serious shortage of funds in Iran itself. In addition, Iran no longer deals exclusively with Hizbollah in Lebanon, an Iranian policy shift that has angered Hizbollah somewhat. Iran has recently begun normal state-to-state relations with Lebanon, including a January

1993 visit of Lebanon's Foreign Minister Faris Buways to Tehran. Iran has also upgraded its Charge d'Affaires in Beirut to the rank of Ambassador.

Syria. Syria's support for Hizbollah is far less clear cut than is Iran's. Syria, which maintains about 35,000 troops in Lebanon, exercises some influence on Hizbollah and sometimes approves of or encourages Hizbollah's aggressive actions. Syria supports Hizbollah, in part to preserve Syria's close relations with Iran, from which it gets political support and significant help in containing Iraq. U.S. Embassy officers in Damascus believe that Syria also sees its alliance with Tehran as a means to prevent any Iranian support for radical Islamists in Syria, such as remnants of the Muslim Brotherhood. Syria permits Hizbollah to operate in areas under Syrian control, such as the Bekaa Valley and it allows Iran to use Syrian territory and facilities, such as Damascus airport, to provide arms to Hizbollah. Syrian encouragement for Hizbollah operations against Israel is also part of Syria's effort to force Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and to exercise leverage over Israel in the Middle East peace process. If Syria decided to move forcefully against Hizbollah, Syrian forces in Lebanon could help the Lebanese Armed Forces disarm Hizbollah at any time and as provided for in the Ta'if Accords.

However, there are instances in which Syria has tried to restrain Hizbollah. For example, Syria backed the Amal militia during the Amal-Hizbollah clashes of the late 1980s and, in 1991, it helped persuade Hizbollah to release remaining U.S. hostages. Syria has also worked to end clashes between Israel and Hizbollah when those clashes threatened to escalate out of control and perhaps lead to fighting between Syria and Israel or to scotch peace negotiations. This appeared to be the case in the July 1993 and July-August 1994 fighting between Hizbollah and Israel. Syria's willingness to curb Hizbollah may explain why Israel and the United States have been somewhat tolerant of Syria's continued presence in Lebanon. (It is required to withdraw from the Beirut area under the 1989 Ta'if Accords.) A Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon might remove Syria's restraining influence in Lebanon.

Implications and Prospects.

Many observers believe that Hizbollah poses several risks to the United States and Israel, but Hizbollah's zenith in Lebanon may have passed. Through its operations in southern Lebanon, its alliances with radical Palestinian groups, and its conduct of international terrorism, Hizbollah is still trying to threaten the U.S.-sponsored Middle East peace process. However, major progress between Israel and the Palestinians—including the September 13, 1993 Israel-PLO agreement and the October 26, 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty—occurred despite the July 1993 clashes and subsequent Hizbollah bombings abroad. Paradoxically, the actions of Hizbollah and its radical Palestinian allies may have backfired in that these actions helped persuade Israel to reach accommodation with the PLO, which appears moderate by comparison. Nonetheless, it is always possible that future Hizbollah attacks in southern Lebanon could succeed in bringing Israeli and Syrian forces into conflict, a possibility that will increase if the

Syrian or Israeli leadership is seeking an opportunity to slow progress in the talks, or if the talks break down altogether.

Hizbollah's relative autonomy also threatens the reconstruction of Lebanon's political and economic system, a goal the United States supports. Any disarmament of Hizbollah would almost certainly need Syrian approval, since the Lebanese armed forces are considered too weak and vulnerable to fragmentation to accomplish that task themselves.

The Lebanese army split in 1984 when it tried to gain control over Shiite areas of Beirut.⁵⁹ If Hizbollah resists a Syrian-Lebanese attempt to disarm it, the organization could trigger a new round of fighting inside Lebanon, possibly including Hizbollah suicide or other type attacks against Syrian troops in Lebanon. Hizbollah clashed with Syria during a violent demonstration to mark Jerusalem Day, March 31, 1994.

Moreover, a Syrian attempt to help Lebanon disarm Hizbollah will almost certainly strain Syria's relationship with Iran, which strongly opposes disarming Hizbollah.

Alternately, it is possible that Hizbollah, realizing it cannot prevent a determined Syrian/Lebanese effort to disarm it, will agree to disarm and focus instead on exploiting Lebanon's legitimate political process. Those who believe Hizbollah will take this route note that an Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon, which would result from a peace settlement, would satisfy a key Hizbollah demand. Some Hizbollah leaders have recently said the resistance to Israel in the south would end if Israel withdrew. Hizbollah may decide to push for seats in the Lebanese government and try to work from within to institute Islamic law in Lebanon. In this scenario, Hizbollah might opt to "live to fight another day," perhaps hoping that the economic benefits of peace will not materialize and that it later can rally support for an Islamic republic.

Although Hizbollah has not committed acts of terrorism against the United States in Lebanon since the release of remaining hostages, U.S. officials nonetheless are concerned about Hizbollah's growing worldwide presence. Hizbollah could potentially use its increasing presence abroad to retaliate against the United States or its allies if, for example, the United States helps Lebanon disarm it. Even if disarmed in Lebanon, Hizbollah also could attempt to carry a continuing war against Israel overseas through a permanent campaign of bombing Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide. Hizbollah could disperse its militiamen to its cells abroad, perhaps hoping to reconstitute as a military force when political winds in Lebanon turn more favorable.

U.S. Policy. The United States clearly wants to limit Hizbollah's influence in Lebanon and its potential for terrorism abroad. According to State Department officials, with certain possible exceptions, the United States has no contacts with Hizbollah, nor are official contacts contemplated.⁶⁰ Hizbollah is officially considered a terrorist group by the State Department, as noted in its annual report to Congress on international terrorism. However, the United States did not oppose Hizbollah's participation in the August/September 1992 parliamentary elections, largely because the Lebanese government legally recognized Hizbollah as a political party in advance of the elections.

The United States supports all aspects of the Ta'if Accords, which present a blueprint for the political reconstruction of Lebanon but also call for the disarming of militias, including Hizbollah. The United States also believes that a successful conclusion to Middle East peace talks, which presumably would result in an Israeli and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, would remove the potential for confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah and facilitate Hizbollah's disarmament. In March 1993, Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian said that, as of December 1992, the Lebanese army had begun to extend its authority in the southern suburbs of Beirut and had retaken control of some of those areas, presumably from Hizbollah.⁶¹ The Lebanese army has also taken over some Hizbollah positions in the Bekaa Valley, including the Shaykh Abdallah barracks, which Iran's Revolutionary Guard took from the Lebanese Army in 1984 and placed at Hizbollah's disposal.⁶² State Department officials say they favor the continuing extension of Lebanese military authority into southern Lebanon and they are pressing for the complete disarming of Hizbollah with its Lebanese and Syrian counterparts. Lebanon, however, says it will not try to disarm Hizbollah as long as Israel maintains its security zone in southern Lebanon. The United States also is urging Syria not to allow resupply of Hizbollah through territory under Syrian control.

Because of the continuing poor relations between the United States and Iran, the United States has little leverage with which to persuade Tehran to end support for Hizbollah. Unilateral U.S. sanctions on Iran, such as the ban on Iranian imports, have had a small effect on Iran's economy, although Iran might be hurt considerably if similar sanctions were adopted by U.S. allies. However, Hizbollah is Iran's most successful example of export of the revolution, and the price for Iran to end its assistance to Hizbollah is likely to be quite high.

The United States also sees economic and military aid as a means to strengthen Lebanon's central government against Hizbollah. The United States has resumed providing International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance, the primary stated purpose of which is to make Lebanese Armed Forces personnel in the program well disposed towards the United States and its values. After consultation with Congress, the IMET program for Lebanon was resumed in March 1993 (FY 1993) after a suspension since January 1991.

In addition, since July 1992, the United States has provided Lebanon excess non-lethal defense articles, including uniforms, helmets, and trucks to help bolster the Lebanese army. The United States had discontinued sales of lethal equipment in 1985 for fear the equipment would not remain under central government control. On July 19, 1993, as tensions between Israel and Hizbollah were escalating, the United States modified its policy somewhat by approving the commercial sale of \$500,000 worth of spare parts for lethal items (track shoes for M113 armored personnel carriers).

Following the July 1993 clashes, in which the Lebanese army deployed to areas near Hizbollah positions, the Secretary of State approved aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The Clinton administration allowed the LAF to buy limited amounts of U.S. lethal equipment with \$500 million Lebanon received from other Arab states and

international lending institutions following the July clashes. The Department of Defense identified used armored personnel carriers, requested by the LAF, for sale to Lebanon.

Other Measures and Options. State Department officials say there is currently no U.S. antiterrorism assistance program for Lebanon because of the poor security conditions there. That program is intended to enhance the ability of recipient country law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in the types of activities (bombing, kidnapping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking) in which Hizbollah has engaged in the recent past. An anti-terrorism assistance program for Lebanon is likely to be instituted if and when the United States deems the security situation there to be acceptable.

Should Hizbollah resume terrorist activities against the United States and the West—in or outside the Middle East—an additional option likely to be considered is military retaliation against it or its sponsors, most notably Iran's Revolutionary Guard. This option reportedly was considered during the period of incarceration of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon but never exercised. The primary drawback at that time was the possibility of revenge by the kidnappers against the U.S. captives. Targets under discussion during that time included Iranian Revolutionary Guard garrisons and training bases for Hizbollah, including the Zabadani base in western Syria and the Shaykh Abdullah Barracks in the Bekaa Valley. Additional targets are possible, such as other Hizbollah training camps; Revolutionary Guard bases in Lebanon, Sudan, or Iran; or Revolutionary Guard military targets such as airfields, naval bases, or even Revolutionary Guard headquarters itself. Recently, President Clinton proposed U.S. economic sanctions against Iran, i.e., preventing U.S. oil companies from trading Iranian oil overseas, but such measures affect the Iranian population as a whole without necessarily impinging on the Revolutionary Guard or Iranian support for Hizbollah.

ENDNOTES

1. This article is an adaptation of U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Hizballah: A Radical Militia in Lebanon*, CRS Report 93-905 F, October 7, 1993, by Kenneth Katzman.

2. According to the State Department's *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993*, produced by the Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Hizbollah now has cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and elsewhere. See p. 46 of that publication, released April 1994.

3. U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992*, April 1993, p. 38.

4. *Ibid.*

5. For further discussion of Lebanon's political crisis, see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Lebanon: The Current Crisis*, by Clyde Mark, CRS Issue Brief 89118, updated regularly.

6. Lara Marlowe, "Cleric Who Holds the Reins of Power," *Financial Times*, August 31, 1991, p. 14. Hizbollah in Lebanon apparently retained connections to *Da'wa* branches in the Persian Gulf states, which are still active, particularly in southern Iraq. During the time of the holding of Western hostages by Hizbollah in Lebanon, a consistent demand of the hostage holders was the release of 17 *Da'wa* prisoners, held in Kuwait for the bombing on December 12, 1983, of six foreign and Kuwaiti installations, including the U.S. Embassy compound in Kuwait. At least one of the *Da'wa* prisoners was reportedly related or linked to Imad Mughniyah, identified alternately as chief of the hostage holders, the head of Islamic Jihad, or chief of security for Hizbollah. See, also, Shimon Shapira, "The Origins of Hizbollah," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 46, Spring 1988, pp. 115-130.
7. Andrew Rathmell, "The War in South Lebanon," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, April 1994, pp. 178-182.
8. The Guard contingent in Lebanon subsequently grew to about 3,000 by the mid-to-late 1980s, but apparently shrank to about 1,000 after the release of remaining U.S. hostages from Lebanon in December 1991. There was speculation that many of them had been sent to Sudan, where a buildup of Revolutionary Guards reportedly has been underway since 1991. When the remaining hostages were released, there also was a debate in the Iranian leadership about whether or not to withdraw the Guards from Lebanon but the Guard resisted and has remained. See Kenneth Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, p. 97.
9. An account of the infiltration of the Revolutionary Guard into the Baalbek area is provided in Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam*, New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1985, p. 80-82.
10. For a further discussion of the factions that comprise Hizbollah, see Shapira, "The Origins of Hizbollah," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Spring 1988.
11. "Backgrounder: Hizbullah (Party of God): Goals and Ideology," *Middle East Reporter*, April 24, 1993, p. 11.
12. Martin Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizbollah," International Security Studies Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper No. 84, Washington, DC: November 1987.
13. Geraldine Brooks, "Changing Image: Radical Islamic Groups in Lebanon Tone Down Anti-Western Fervor," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 19, 1991, p. A1.
14. Giles Trendle, "Lebanon: The Grass Roots of Success," *The Middle East*, February 1993, p. 12.
15. *Ibid.*

16. Nadim Ladki, "Die Hard Hizbollah Guerrillas Torment Israel," Reuters, August 19, 1993.

17. Andrew Tarnowski, "Guerrilla 'Mini-Army' Wins Israel's Respect," Reuters, September 30, 1994.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Wright, *Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Militant Islam*, p. 228.

20. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Will Try to Buy Antiaircraft Missiles Back From Afghans," *The New York Times*, July 24, 1993, p. A1.

21. "Iran Said Training Hizbollah Fighters in Weapon Use," *Al Sharq Al Awsat*, October 3, 1994, p. 5, in *FBIS-NES-94-192*, October 4, 1994, p. 58.

22. From the time of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979 until Hizbollah's formation in 1982, Amal enjoyed the support of Iran, which was looking to promote its revolution to Lebanese Shias. Iran backed away from Amal when Hizbollah, which was more in line with Iran's ideology, was formed.

23. Amal, which has suspended its militia activities in accordance with post-Taif reconciliation, is led by Nabih Berri, who now serves as Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament.

24. Many analysts believed that Amal's patron, Syria, encouraged Amal to clash with Hizbollah in an effort to limit Hizbollah's influence in Lebanon. Syria is a secular state that, to some degree, fears the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and has generally tried to prevent other powers from exercising major influence in Lebanon. However, Syria has tolerated Hizbollah's presence in areas of Lebanon that are under Syrian control (such as the Bekaa Valley) in order to maintain good relations with Iran and to gain leverage vis-a-vis Israel.

25. The flareup appeared to temporarily threaten the peace talks but did not derail them; and an eleventh round began on August 31, 1993. However, according to press accounts, the fighting caused Secretary of State Christopher to abbreviate a diplomatic trip to Asia in order to deal with defusing the confrontations.

26. Chris Hedges, "Israel Continues to Blast Villages in South Lebanon," *The New York Times*, July 28, 1993, p. A1; Clyde Haberman, "Bombs Kill 8 Israeli Soldiers on Patrol in South Lebanon," *The New York Times*, August 20, 1993, p. A1.

27. Some Hizbollah leaders later said Hizbollah had not agreed not to attack northern Israel, and that the ceasefire represented only an "understanding," not an agreement.

28. Steven Holmes, "Peres Praises Syrian Leader for Role in Ceasefire," *The New York Times*, August 4, 1993, p. A7.
29. "Lebanese-Syrian Summit to Step Up Coordination Follows Strains Over Army Deployment in UNIFIL Zone," *Middle East Mirror*, August 16, 1993, pp. 20-21.
30. "Lebanese Leaders in Talks With Syria's Assad," Reuters, August 16, 1993.
31. "Lebanese Army to Deploy Up to 'Security Zone' Alongside UNIFIL," *Mideast Mirror*, August 2, 1993, p. 13.
32. Martin Kramer, *Hezbollah's Vision of the West*, p. 59.
33. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Hamas: The Organization, Goals, and Tactics of a Militant Palestinian Organization*, by James Wootten, CRS Report No. 93-511F, revised and updated August 19, 1993.
34. Barton Gellman, " Hamas Kidnaps Israeli, Threatens to Kill Him," *The Washington Post*, October 12, 1994, p. A27.
35. "Partisans of Terror," *U.S. News and World Report*, August 8, 1994, pp. 36-38; "Velayati Said to Offer Hizbollah Assurances," *Al Sharq Al Awsat*, August 23, 1994, p. 3, in *FBIS-NES-94-164*, August 24, 1994, p. 53.
36. Paul Wilkinson, "Hezbollah—A Critical Appraisal," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1993, pp. 369-370; "Paraguay: Sources on Possible Hizbollah Safe Haven," *FBIS*, November 25, 1994; Douglas Jehl, "Iran Backed Terrorists Are Growing More Aggressive, U.S. Warns," *The New York Times*, March 18, 1993, p. A8.
37. *Ibid.*
38. U.S. Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992," p. 22. The State Department report adds that Iran "at least had foreknowledge of this act and was probably involved."
39. State Department Regular Briefing, Federal News Service, August 18, 1993.
40. Jehl, p. A-8.
41. Aidan Hartley, "U.S. Says Hizbollah May Plan Car Bombs in Somalia," Reuters, November 15, 1993; "Hizbollah Announces Death of Officer in Bosnia," *Al Shira'*, October 3, 1994, p. 7, in *FBIS-NES-94-195*, October 7, 1994, p. 37.
42. Wilkinson, p. 370.

43. "Iran Hostage Takers Now Hold Key Posts," *Roanoke Times and World News*, September 8, 1994, p. A11.
44. *Text of an Open Letter Presented by Hizbollah to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World*, pamphlet issued in Beirut, February 16, 1985, p. 6; Martin Kramer, "Hezbollah's Vision, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper No. 16, 1989, p. 51. This open letter is commonly referred to as Hizbollah's manifesto or charter.
45. The Taif Accords refers to an agreement on a possible solution to Lebanon's civil war, reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia. The process began in September 1989 in Taif and was formally approved by deputies of Lebanon's National Assembly on November 5, 1989. For further discussion of the Taif Accords and their provisions, see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Lebanon: The Current Crisis*, by Clyde Mark, CRS Issue Brief 89118, updated regularly.
46. "Hizbollah Faces Divisions Over Iranian Policies," *Beirut Al Shira'*, January 4, 1993, in *FBIS*, January 5, 1993, p. 34.
47. "Nasrallah Views Hizbollah's Political Activity," Tehran *Keyhan* in Persian, October 27, 1992, p. 16, in *FBIS-NES- 92-217*, November 9, 1992, p. 42.
48. Tarnowski, September 30, 1994.
49. "Nasrallah on Hizbollah's Political Profile, Israeli Prisoners," Tehran *Resalat* in Persian, October 13, 1992, in *FBIS-NES-92-209*, October 28, 1992, p. 38.
50. Author's interviews with Syrian officials in Damascus, January 1995.
51. Magnus Ranstorp, "Hezbollah's Future?—Part 2, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 81-83.
52. *Middle East Mirror*, August 12, 1993, p. 19.
53. Steve Coll, "Multicontinental Investigators Target Global Bombers of Jews," *The Washington Post*, July 31, 1994, p. A1.
54. Author's interview with Lebanese diplomats, August 17, 1993.
55. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1985-1992*, by Richard Grimmett, CRS Report No. 93-656F, July 19, 1993, p. 56. The figures for arms transfer values are rounded to the nearest \$100 million.
56. "Lebanon: Hizbollah Reportedly Dismantling Military Installations," *Agence France Presse*, June 28, 1991.

57. "Hizbollah Faces Division Over Iranian Policies," Beirut *Al Shira'*, January 4, 1993, in *FBIS-NES-93-002*, January 5, 1993, p. 34. Some Hizbollah leaders believe Iran has cut back its aid because it wants Hizbollah to achieve self-sufficiency through its own businesses.

58. *Mideast Mirror*, August 12, 1993, p. 19.

59. "Lebanon's Army Steers Clear of Hizbollah," *Jerusalem Report*, December 29, 1994, pp. 30-32.

60. U.S. officials noted in August 1993 that there may be some operational contact with Hizbollah regarding the security of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. They note that similar arrangements have been made in the past with such groups as the PLO in order to ensure the security of the Embassy and U.S. personnel.

61. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub- committee on Europe and the Middle East, *Developments in the Middle East: March 1993*, Hearing, 103rd Congress, 1st Session, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 9, 1993, p. 38-39.

62. "Lebanon: Hizbollah Reportedly Dismantling Military Installations," *Agence France Presse*, July 28, 1991.

CHAPTER 2

A RADICAL ISLAMIST CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

Lew B. Ware

Introduction.

The “new world order” is as much a term of uncertain significance for the nations of the Middle East as it is a representation of the profound ambiguity that today qualifies the reconceptualization of the international political system. Statism and pan-Arabism, for so long a comfortable context for the evolution of the regional social and political order, can no longer be considered exclusive formulas for the comprehensive solution of contemporary Middle Eastern socio-political ills. Only religious nationalism, as the primary competitor of statism and pan-Arabism for regional dominance, has demanded the right to define both the place and the meaning of the Middle East in the “new world order” and to recast its options in radically different political terms.

Of course, the appearance of religious nationalism in the Middle East is not new. During the past century and one half of Middle Eastern history, the politicization of Islam has played an important part in crafting the response of Middle Easterners to colonialism and nation-building. What is new is the demonstrably radical solution that, in the name of a rejuvenated faith, religious nationalism offers to meet the challenge that the “new world order” presents to a traditionalist Islam allegedly betrayed by secular philosophies. We in the West have been content inaccurately to label this challenge “fundamentalist.” The nature of the challenge from religious nationalism clearly indicates that it embraces a revolutionary ideology the definition of which the indeterminate nature of Islamic fundamentalism simply cannot encompass. We are not talking here about the various aspects of reformism as ideology in terms of which Islamic fundamentalism is commonly qualified. We are talking, on the contrary, about radical Islamism, an activist and nationalist religio-political force that has been evolving since the early decades of this century, has had its epiphany in the Iranian revolution of 1979, and which continues today to exert an important influence on contemporary Middle Eastern society. Underpinning radical Islamist activism and justifying its use of violence is *jihad*, a theoretical and practical concept of conflict whose roots stretch back to the very earliest days of the Islamic ecumene which Islamism has revived and now employs to serve the purpose of reshaping the regional political landscape.

The author of this chapter proposes to trace the historical evolution of the meaning of Islamic *jihad*, demonstrate in what ways it has been radicalized, especially by Khomeini and Hizbollah, and to pose the question of its importance for the stability of the post-Gulf War regional environment. To accomplish this task the chapter has a number of interrelated objectives. First, it will explain the meaning of *jihad* as an Islamic concept of conflict that has evolved differently within the historical framework of Sunni and Shii sectarianism. Second, it will discuss the situational character of *jihad* as a manifestation of the survival ethos of Muslim communities faced with non-Muslim hostility and by so

doing point out how analytically dangerous it is to presume that *jihad* possesses a monolithic and inflexible nature. Third, it will show how the Islamist variety of *jihad*, in adapting itself to the circumstances of the secular regional order, seeks to supplant it. And lastly, the author will suggest that there exists a correlation between the level of Islamist radicalism against the regional secular state and the degree to which the concept of *jihad* is translated into direct political action.

Because radical Islamism transcends the boundaries of the traditional Middle Eastern region, many believe that Islamist *jihad* is unequivocally dangerous and therefore that the containment of radical Islamism is crucial. Certainly it cannot be denied that radical Islamism extends its appeal to the universal Muslim community and in that sense is a transnational phenomenon. But one must be careful to avoid the temptation to perceive in radical Islamism the spearhead of an Islamic civilizational crusade with predetermined historical fault lines that pits the Muslim East against the Christian West.¹ By the same token, one must be equally aware of the perils in explaining radical Islamism solely in terms of its Khomeinist variation and in assigning to the Iranian Islamic Republic sinister motives with import for global security. Without taking a position on these specific issues and, yet on the other hand, without minimizing the potential problems involved in the link between Iranian Islamists, their surrogates and acts of international terrorism, the reader is counseled against the assumption that radical Islamism and Iranian foreign policy are synonymous and thus will bring Iran and its proxies into inevitable collision with U.S. national security interests. This being said, the author hopes nevertheless to shed some light on the contribution that an understanding of Islamist *jihad* makes to the changeable nature of the relationship between Iranian Islamism and the external world.

An Islamic Concept of Conflict from the Sunni Point of View.

Religious cultures have concepts of conflict which can be perceived as means by which religions keep from dying; that is, from tolerating truths which tend to exclude them. Islam is no exception to this. The Islamic concept of conflict is called *jihad*, which means “striving in the path of the One God” (*jihad fi sabil Allah*). Conceived broadly, *jihad* signifies the obligation of every Muslim to strive for both the physical and spiritual defense of the *ummah*, the community of true belief and of salvation. It is Islamic doctrine that death in the defense of the *ummah* assures the believer immediate entry into paradise absolved of the sins for which he would have accounted before God on the Day of Reckoning.

The Quran, which is the immutable, eternal and final revelation of God, enjoins the faithful to accept the burden of *jihad*. And so *jihad* derives its force from the principle that Islam is universal and true for all time.² Since the Quran is also the principal material source of Islamic law, *jihad* is more than just *bellum pium*, that is, sanctioned according to universal religious precepts; it enjoys full legal sanction as *bellum justum* (just war).³

The various Islamic denominations place a different accent on the martial and the moral aspects of *jihad*: the classical Sunnism of the Arabo-Islamic empire emphasized the defense of the community and its faith through the territorial expansion of the

imperium while Shii tradition demands that *jihad* “be declared vehemently against the agents of discrimination, injustice, deprivation, oppression, strangulation, ‘taghut-ism’ (acts of Satan) and subservience to other-than-God.”⁴ But the result is the same; *jihad* is both a legal instrument and a means of litigation with which the Sunni and Shii *ummahs* define and conduct their relations with the non-Muslim world.⁵

The emergence of a concept of conflict from the moral imperative to assure the security of the *ummah* and through it the supremacy of the true and just faith presupposes an idea of peace that achieves permanency only when Islam becomes the universal religion explicit in Quranic revelation. The world is thus divided into two spheres: where *sharia* holds sway and right belief is assured, the *Dar al-Islam* (Abode of Submission to the One God) guarantees a perfect moral order of which *jihad* is the instrument of hegemony; wherever disbelief is, the *Dar al-Harb* (Abode of War) exists implying an absence of liberty to embrace self-evident truths.⁶ These worlds have always been contiguous in space but, as the Pakistani scholar Muhammad Iqbal points out, Islamic “likemindedness” attaches to the *Dar al-Islam* the characteristic of “border- lessness.”⁷

Inasmuch as non-Muslims have ruled at times over Muslims and have alienated Muslim territory from the *Dar al-Islam*, the believer cannot carry out his Quranic duty to “command the good and to forbid evil” with respect to defense of the *ummah* without a possibility of enjoying the liberty to avoid the oppressiveness of the disbelievers.⁸ In classical terms, then, *jihad* ceases when the *Dar al-Harb* is absorbed into the *Dar al-Islam*, that is, when universal religious liberty is restored.⁹ Until that time *jihad* persists as Islam’s struggle against “persecutors in order to end persecution.”¹⁰ The Syrian scholar, Bassam Tibi, contends that in this permanently evolving cosmic imbalance there can be little latitude for absolute toleration because Islamic tolerance refers exclusively to the Jews and Christians in and outside the *ummah*.¹¹ The Jews and the Christians are “People of the Book,” scriptures whose imperfect revelations prefigure the perfected Quran. Hence they must be respected. But this does not imply that Islam possesses either a concept of, or guarantees the right to, an equality of difference that applies to all religions. And this was certainly the case with the polytheists of the *Dar al-Harb* against whom *jihad* was applied without the compunctions reserved for the tolerated peoples.

Thus the distinction between the defensive and offensive aspects of the concept of *jihad* is unclear. Likewise the equality of violence under a state of war that marks *de jure* and *de facto* aspects of conflict in Western international law is also absent. Since *jihad* is a religious duty it cannot be dictated by contractual conventions defining a legal state of war without hostilities or hostilities without a legal declaration.¹² Although *jihad* certainly possesses defensive and offensive aspects that relate, strategically and tactically, to the conduct of conflict (*jus in bello*), *jihad* is always offensive war in its intention.¹³ Therefore to claim that the various reasons for proclaiming *jihad* (*jus ad bellum*) are acts of self-defense in the Western sense, such as punishment against Islam’s enemies, support of oppressed Muslims in the *Dar al-Harb*, subjugation of Muslim rebels in the *Dar al-Islam*, or idealistic war to “command the good and forbid evil,” begs the question of the nature of Islamic conflict.

So long as Islam was imperially on the march; that is, so long as a clear understanding of what constituted internal peace and external war between the two abodes of belief and disbelief, the falling together of an offensive and defensive concept of *jihad* was not a matter for great controversy among Muslims. The authority for the religious definition of peace and war came from God and was declared by God's executor for his *ummah*, the caliph. That authority gave internal legitimacy to the early confederation in Medina under the Prophet and his successors, while military expansion held it together externally.¹⁴ And so during the first two centuries of Islamic history, the Muslim faith pushed steadily outward under *jihad* toward the realization of a *pax islamica* which Muslims deemed inevitable for the triumph of God's "best" community.

This is not to say that the Quran decreed, or the Prophet himself demanded, that *jihad* be waged continually. In the Quran and, secondarily, in the Hadith (Sayings and Deeds of the Prophet), the verses pertaining to *jihad* often contradict themselves as to the possibility of maintaining truces and armistices indefinitely. The problem was that the exegetical method of Quranic interpretation permitted the emphasis of earlier revelatory verses declaring peace over later ones that declared war. This led to the "atomization" of the historical situations which *jihad* was obliged to define. Therefore, by avoiding an examination of the historical context in which the concept of *jihad* evolved in the Quran, jurists assured that permanent hostility between the *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb* could be maintained as the norm.¹⁵

But history was eventually to have its effect on the norms of *jihad*. By the 11th century Islamic expansion had run its course and a triumphal Christianity took the counteroffensive in Spain and in the Holy Land. The pagan Mongols followed on the heels of the Christians. Adapting to the nature of its adversaries and the type of wars they fought, the Islamic imperium found itself fighting defensive wars against invaders which departed from the classical doctrine of *jihad*.¹⁶ The result was ultimately a shrinking and a stabilization of the boundaries between the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. This new stability also demanded that Islamic thinkers reformulate the notion of a binomial world to take into account the many non-Muslim states and principalities now on its periphery with which Muslims were not actually at war.¹⁷

Thus between the *Dar al-Islam* and the *Dar al-Harb* there came into being conceptually a "third world," so to speak, called the *Dar al-Sulh* (Abode of Armistice) which, under treaties of coexistence, was not subject to *sharia* law.¹⁸ These arrangements between Islam and non-Islamic states were undertaken for the protection of the *ummah*. Muslims and non-Muslims crossed the frontiers under protection of personal immunity (*aman*) and negotiated directly with each other. While these temporary privileges did not imply recognition by Islam of the states the holders of safe conduct represented, the *Dar al-Islam* was nevertheless now able to interact directly with the outside under conditions of relative security. With the impetus for offensive *jihad* effectively dormant, the defensive nature of "striving in the path of the One God" evolved a less ambiguous meaning. The nearest equivalent to this state of affairs under the Western law of nations was insurgency in the sense that Islam's tacit acceptance of the *Dar al-Sulh*, while not precluding a later *de facto* or *de jure* recognition of the two parties, certainly did not

exclude a return to hostilities on a limited scale.¹⁹ But neutrality played no role in this equation since in Islamic law conflictual relations with a non-Muslim belligerent could not be postponed indefinitely.²⁰

The process of historical interpenetration of the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds inevitably accelerated and brought new ideas to bear on their respective world views. Not only did borders form and have to be defended; the universal values of *sharia* and the assumption that the classical Islamic imperium vouchsafed God's political authority within those borders also came under the assault of alien ideas at a time when Islamic imperial power was in a state of rapid decay. The military and ideological challenge from Christendom and later from the Mongol Horde was one aspect of that decay; the other challenge occurred when the Muslim periphery attempted to wrest control from the central institution of the caliphate, causing both the empire and the unity of the *ummah* it represented to break up from the inside.

The influence of these events on the concept of *jihad* was immense. So long as a central Muslim power existed backed by military force, *jihad* could be accomplished as a collective duty (*fard kifayah*) which meant that certain categories of people were exempt from army service and the declaration of *jihad* was limited to the head of state.²¹ But when the validity of the *sharia* was put into question as the true moral order for society, the attack was perceived to be directed against Islamic values. In this case *jihad* came to mean more than simply *jihad* of the "hand"; that is, of the sword; it became also *jihad* of the "tongue and of the heart" and therefore required the individual obligation (*fard 'ain*) of each Muslim to prevent further depredations of Islamic society and its true beliefs. Such was the view of the 12th century jurist, Ibn Taymiyyah, who was to have in later centuries a profound ideological impact both on reformist Islam and radical Islamism.

The Islamic ecumene and its unitary power was a myth which was further eroded as clashes between Muslim principalities and peoples increased over time. These clashes were also called *jihad* since only *jihad* is just and no other concept of war was permitted. But the Quran forbids *jihad* between Muslims. In fact, these conflicts were "secular." Many Muslim jurists called them simply *harb* (war), disapproved of them and endeavored to explain them away as social aberrations inconsistent with *sharia*. The 14th century North African jurist, Ibn Khaldun, however, whose work laid the groundwork for Western historical sociology and philosophy of history, saw war as inherent in man. Because Ibn Khaldun believed that human nature made war the norm and not the exception,²² the concept of *jihad* as the just means for the territorial expansion of God's preordained moral order became more and more a problematical issue.

The Sunni perspective on *jihad* depended for its cogency on the inseparability of religion and politics. Theoretically speaking, the *ummah* and the state were unified under the divinely instituted caliphal office. The caliphate executed God's design for the universalization of Islam. But when the first Turkish republic replaced the Ottoman Turkish Empire as successor state to the old Arabo-Islamic imperium and, as a consequence, the caliphate was disestablished, the reimposition of an Islamic world order as an extension of the imperial ideal was moot.

The process of imperial disintegration had in fact spanned almost the past half millennium of history, during the last century and one half of which European colonialism dominated the relationship of the *Dar al-Islam* and the *Dar al-Harb*. Colonialism offered the Islamic world a vision of the secular state in which dogmatic *sharia* and ritual practice were relegated to the domain of personal conscience, and material and human improvement were elevated through science to the status of social virtue. Being a practical rather than abstract faith, Islam responded to these new circumstances by attempting to bring the *sharia* into line with Western secular modernism. This adaptation extended also to the concept of *jihad*. To the Islamic modernists *jihad* was a purely defensive principle of war.²³ They accepted the prevalent Western view that international relations were grounded in a peaceful intercourse between nations. The modernists proposed that disbelief alone was not a sufficient cause for conflict but imposed the additional requirement of physical oppression of Muslims by non-Muslims before *jihad* could be declared.²⁴ In this way the modernists defended themselves against the Western accusation that Islamic *jihad* was aggressive. Rather they insisted on a “greater” *jihad* of the heart and mind, which through reflection—and abundant apologetics—would defend and strengthen Islamic values under the assault of Western belief systems and lead eventually to the West’s acceptance of the self-evident truth of Islam.

For this to materialize the *ummah* had first to reform itself. Such a reformation did not, however, demand that the conditions of Muslim backwardness be addressed in structural terms. Inasmuch as the normative, moral orientation of Islam remained the decisive element of modernist discourse, the problems of Islam could be solved by behaving according to the literal dictates of holy scripture purified of non-Islamic accretions.²⁵ Thus modernist *jihad* meant war against the immoral base instincts of the self. It presupposed the individual obligation (*fard ‘ain*) to make oneself better by defending oneself intellectually against falsehood. It proposed that Islam could master Western science, turn it to the advantage of the *ummah*, and raise Muslims to the ranks of the Europeans while preserving simultaneously their faith. *Jihad* was the highest form of knowledge. The *ummah* itself had complete command over the working out of a formula for progress and the elimination, through the reeducation of youth, of pernicious Western influence.²⁶ The relationship between *jihad* and the resurrection of the *ummah* was set out in terms of religio-social monisms: that is, because Islam had positive social significance, a return to religiosity by means of an “inner” *jihad* was beneficial for the development of the community.²⁷

To recapitulate the above discussion, the Sunni view of *jihad* depended on a ruler who declared war and the instrumentality of a state which executed his orders insofar as they were consistent with *sharia* law. When Islamic lands fell under the sway of Europe and direction by a divinely appointed executor was no longer possible, this active offensive was transformed into the active defense of each Muslim to protect his way of life as enshrined in the precepts of the *ummah*. The assumption was that Islam could coexist with secular Europe on the legal plane because it, too, was grounded in a just and merciful law of nations. Furthermore, Islam could meet the requirements of European

scientific positivism and live under the institutions of popular democracy without the separation of church from state. The emphasis was therefore laid on the ethical value of the law as it applied to *jihad* and not on the elaboration of rules for the conduct of conflict.²⁸ This, in turn, confirmed a civilizing mission for Islam.

The Islamic modernists' view of *jihad* collapsed with their failure to render compatible the values of Islam and modernism within the institutional framework of the contemporary secular Sunni Muslim state, many of which have been unable to provide for the moral and material welfare of the *ummah*. The reaction gave rise to radical religious movements which responded with the elaboration of fully political ideologies. In this way, Islamic reformism slowly gave way to Islamist activism. The Islamist position on *jihad* was fundamentally opposed to that of the modernists. But as for the strategy and tactics of Islamist *jihad*, that is with respect to its view of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, the political cultures of the various peoples to whom this new *jihad* was preached exercised as much an influence as did classical Islamic doctrine. To understand the evolution of Islamist *jihad*, we must first, however, appreciate its links to the Shiite perspective.

An Islamic Concept of Conflict from the Shii Point of View.

The seeds of the Sunni-Shii split were nourished by a political quarrel during the first 30 years of Islamic history as to who possessed the legitimate authority to exercise both spiritual and temporal successorship to the Prophet and to execute God's will for his *ummah*. Those who believed that the Prophet favored the passing of his authority to the most qualified of his Quraysh tribe through an election by peers proposed Mu'awiyah, the governor of Damascus, as the Prophet's successor. Those who opposed the concept of egalitarian election believed that Ali, the fourth caliph and the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, had the right to govern the *ummah* by virtue of his pious character and his blood relationship to the Prophet's immediate family.²⁹ The "partisans" (Shi'a) of Ali contested the pretensions of Mu'awiyah to the office of caliph and in the ensuing struggle lost a decisive military engagement to his forces. Declaring their actions to reflect, *ex post facto*, the Prophet's normative behavior (*sunnah*), Mu'awiyah's men established egalitarian election as the norm underpinning the institutional legitimacy of the classical Sunni Arabo-Islamic caliphate. Although the Sunni-Shii split was caused primarily by a conflict of clans, it was also brought about by a clash between the two competing theories of egalitarian and imperial governance.

At the moment when enthusiasm for Ali's political cause was transferred to his person and after his death to his designated successors in direct line through his martyred sons, we can say that Shiism has its beginnings as a religious sect. To Shiites, Ali and his successors are, like the Prophet, both caliphs and imams, that is, the epitome in one individual of secular and religious leadership. Although schisms arose concerning the right of the fifth and the seventh imams to lead the Shii community, the imamic line continued uninterrupted until the disappearance of the twelfth imam in the late ninth century. This twelfth imam was said to be in a state of "occultation," out of the sight and hearing of humankind, but would return at a time of great troubles to right the wrongs of

the world. Muslims who adhere to this messianic belief in the efficacy of the Hidden Imam (*walayah*) are called Twelver or Imami Shiites. They constitute the mainstream of the Shii community and are, for the most part, ethnic Persians.

For centuries the Imami Shiites lived among the majority Sunnis without the power to alter the political disposition of their *ummah*. To the Shii mind the Sunni were usurpers who had perpetrated evils on the Shii community. Sunni control over territory of overwhelming Shii preponderance rendered these territories technically *Dar al-Harb* in Shii eyes. Consequently, the Shiites conceived of *jihad* in a fundamentally different way than their Sunni overlords, especially with respect to the question who could lead *jihad* and against whom *jihad* might be waged. With no state of their own and no political leader to serve as the agent of *jihad*, the Shiites were forbidden to wage legitimate war until the Hidden Imam emerged from his occultation and gave his consent to *jihad*. When the Imam reappeared the object of Shii *jihad* would be to cleanse the world of the injustices inflicted upon the Shii community by the unbelieving Sunnis and other heretics. As in Sunnism this duty conforms with the Quranic injunction to “command the good and forbid evil” in pursuit of which the Hidden Imam would declare *jihad*. But that declaration could be made only if the unbelievers first refused a call to accept the true faith, that is to say if they failed to obey the Hidden Imam.³⁰

Not only is the declaration of offensive *jihad* the prerogative of the infallible Hidden Imam, it is also linked to the concept of *walayah* through which absolute allegiance to the Imam is enjoined. Since all true believers owe allegiance to the Imam, to go on *jihad* without the sanction of such allegiance meant that *jihad* could never constitute *iman* (faith), that is, a necessary requirement for salvation.³¹ Therefore, *jihad* for Imami Shiites, in principle, has been suspended indefinitely. In sum, the suspension of an offensive *jihad* is, for the Sunni, a response to the end of imperial expansion; to the Shiites *jihad* has been declared in abeyance in response to the absence of the Hidden Imam and his authority.

Early Shii historiography is filled with sufferings and martyrdom at the hands of the Sunni. Sufferings engendered pietistic expectation of final vindication and personal preparation for the millennium. Transposed to a spiritual plane, *jihad* came to mean the greater spiritual struggle for knowledge of right from wrong and of mastery over base instincts. As the noted Shii philosopher Sayyid Hossein Nasr explains,

Jihad [is] not simply the defense or extension of Islamic borders . . . but the constant inner war against all that veils man from the truth and destroys his equilibrium. The greater holy war (*al-jihad al-akbar*) is . . . like the unseen warfare of orthodox spirituality, the very means of opening the royal path to the center of the heart . . .³²

This mystical vision of *jihad* as self-discipline in the expectation of the imminent end of time favored nonviolence. In giving physical representation to this view of *jihad*, Shii thinkers envisaged a “frontier” between the Abode of Submission to the One God and the Abode of War. On this frontier, called the *Dar al-Iman* (Abode of Faith), Shiism would

vie for the souls of the infidels.³³ Such conflict was to be executed as a campaign of proselytization and thus would postpone the onslaught of unbelief. But it ought not be conceived as aggressive *jihad*, properly speaking. Rather it was an ethical “holy war of defense” (*harb difa’iyyah muqaddasah*) against the *ahl al-baghy* (those who do not accept the imamic principle; i.e., the Sunni world and other heretics) which was both licit and commendable in the absence of the Hidden Imam.³⁴ For moral reasons, then, every true believer had the duty (*fard ‘ain*) to wage a defensive “war” against unbelief and for his *ummah* by resisting the imposition of tyrannical rule.³⁵

The elaboration of the true nature and conduct of conflict fell ultimately to the most learned Shii clerics (*mujtahidun*) of each historical period. The authority to explore these questions did not emanate from the incommunicado Hidden Imam, however. Rather it emanated from the clergy who, because of their knowledge of imamic law, gradually arrogated to themselves, in the absence of autonomous Shii secular power, the right to legislate for the Shii *ummah* in all religious and socio-political matters. Thus, over the centuries of political powerlessness, the Imami Shii clergy developed a theory of general agency which justified their claim to be the representatives on earth of the Hidden Imam and which necessarily encompassed all manner of speculation regarding *jihad*.

Until the restoration of Shii imperial power under the Safavid Persian shahs at the beginning of the 16th century, the clergy seemed content to assign *jihad* either an eschatological value or one that encouraged passive resistance to usurping infidel authority. When the Safavid shahs made Shiism the official cult of their empire, the rulers assumed the prerogative to declare and execute *jihad* since, to legitimize their power, they conveniently claimed descent from a collateral branch of the family of the first Shii imam Ali.

The consolidation of the shahs’ prerogative within the framework of an imperial Shii state and political culture put the clergy in an ambiguous position. Safavid imperial expansion had reactivated the need for the political and military aspects of *jihad* as the cornerstone of an aggressive imperial foreign policy. In subjecting the concept of *jihad* to the principle of political expediency, the shahs blurred the already indeterminate classical legal distinction between aggressive and defensive conflict. As long as secular imperial power remained strong and the shahs officially patronized the clerical class, the clergy acquiesced in the usurpation of their traditional privilege to interpret the Hidden Imam’s law. The result was an uneasy accommodation of religion to imperial political ethics.³⁶ Yet once imperial power began to wane in the middle of 18th century with the replacement of the Safavids by the Qajar dynasty, which did not make the same claim to imamic descent, the clergy reasserted its primacy in the domain of legal interpretation of *jihad*.

The decadence of imperial Iran, which the clergy associated with the external pressure of Britain and Russia on the frontier and European domination of domestic economic life, gave the clerics opportunities for greater political influence. The manipulation of *jihad* was an important key to the pursuit of these opportunities and to the gradual transformation of *de facto* clerical authority into *de jure* clerical power.

When the clergy called for *jihad* against the Russians in the early 19th century, they were acting in the absence of a strong state to protect the Shii *ummah*. Contrary to classical Shii theology, they reasoned that *jihad* in times of national danger was more praiseworthy in the absence than in the presence of the Hidden Imam.³⁷ This reasoning was extended to the struggle against internal domination of an already weakened ruling establishment by foreign powers. Clerical reinterpretation of *jihad* tended to cast doubts on the legitimacy of the shahs but did not challenge that legitimacy per se. It simply reflected the fact that the clergy now clearly thought of themselves as both deputies of the Hidden Imam and the chief guardians of Shii society and its values. And so, whereas *jihad* had in the past a single aggressive purpose bound up in the working out of the messianic eschatology of the Hidden Imam, it now had a purpose more in line with the Sunni perspective: to repel the physical and spiritual attacks on the Shii *ummah* from outside and inside the nation. But whatever the circumstances of the various *jihads*, the clergy proclaimed they considered each to be defensive in intent if not in actual practice. From the Shii point of view it is clear that *jihad* was to be waged in the service of self-preservation whenever strong secular power proved unable to defend the *ummah*. For this reason Shii doctrine was less restrictive and more flexible in the conduct of *jihad* than was its Sunni counterpart.

Following are examples from Imami literature concerning the conduct of *jihad*: 1) It mattered little who granted permission to go on defensive *jihad*, only that a respected *mujtahid* take the responsibility; 2) under conditions of offensive *jihad*, where the state had an army at its disposal, *jihad* was a collective duty, but in the defensive mode it was every believer's obligation and thus no exemptions were possible; 3) as opposed to the Sunni conception, Shii *jihad* for the defense of the faith and the Shii *ummah* operated under no constraint of time; 4) everyone had to pay for the conduct of *jihad*; 5) the spoils of such a *jihad* had to be used for its continuation; 6) if adequate funds were not available, they could be coerced; 7) in order to prosecute *jihad*, treaties impeding it could be revoked; 8) under defensive conditions, no distinction was made between unbelievers and Muslims who rendered them aid; 9) it was not necessary to call first on the unbelievers to accept the true faith, thus losing the element of military surprise; 10) believers do not necessarily have to outnumber unbelievers; 11) all stratagems were acceptable; 12) and finally, all cease-fires could be violated.³⁸

From the above we can see that the historical evolution of the Twelver Imami Shii community, even after Shiism eventually gained official status in Iran, left traces of a marked minority mentality on its concept of *jihad* and on the meaning of defensive and offensive war. By placing its emphasis more on right belief, adherence to the law, social justice, messianism, community solidarity, and individual responsibility rather than on the state's role in the legitimation, protection, and propagation of these benefits for humankind, Imami Shiism was encouraging a kind of conflict that approximated most closely what in the West might be called revolutionary warfare. This important distinction, born from the marriage of Persian political culture and ethos to Shii millenarianism, had a profound effect on the development of radical Islamism throughout the contemporary Muslim world.

A Variety of Contemporary Radical Islamist *Jihad*.

The ultimate objective of religion is utopian since religion proposes that the purpose of human history may be found in an ideal and perfected cosmic order through which God makes meaningful the chaos of the temporal world. It is when religion rejects expectation for action in its endeavor to overcome an existing situation that faith begins to lose its other-worldly, utopian characteristic. Put in another way, when religion includes a program that mobilizes sentiment toward the goal of resolving a given issue, it crosses the boundary into political ideology in the contemporary sense of the word.³⁹ Under such circumstances religion is intended to control the behavior, mood, sentiments, and values of a society on behalf of the whole community for which rituals act as instruments of instruction and direction.⁴⁰ At this juncture Islam—the religious culture—transitions to Islamism—the political ideology—and Khomeini's Shiism may be called one of its most radical variants.

In mobilizing the religious sentiments of the Persian people in a defense of the *ummah* against the state, Khomeini radicalized Shiism and put it at the service of socio-political transformation. Khomeini's Islamism was nourished by a political culture which evolved from the long struggle between the Persian imperial state and the clergy for social control and which, once Iran fell under the influence of the colonial West, established the clerics as the general agents of the Hidden Imam. But the historical consolidation of this doctrinal tendency in Twelver Imami Shiism is not sufficient to explain Khomeini's world view. His personality, as a reflection of the Persian cultural ethos, plays an equally important role in the evolution of his thought.

Khomeini was a radical moralist who applied the literal law (*nomos*) of the twelve Shii Imams to Muslim society. From his point of view, the divine origin of Shii *sharia* law rendered satanic all that did not emanate from it. According to Khomeini it is every Muslim's duty to participate in "nomocratic" politics and combat the will of Satan.⁴¹ If the roots of this view were not imbedded in the Zoroastrian ethos of Persian culture, it would be possible to dismiss Khomeini psychologically as an aberrant personality.⁴² The prophet Zarathustra was obsessed with the punishment of evildoers. In his reform of Mazdaism the dualist motif of light and darkness reifies in the free choice of every Mazdean to engage in the struggle against the Devil and thereby to secure for himself the paradise which the Lord Ahura promises to the righteous.⁴³ Lord Ahura shows to his appointed servant, Zarathustra, the pattern of behavior which will cure the existence of all its terrors and transfigure the world.⁴⁴ Zarathustra, whose holiness is a manifestation of Ahura's goodness, could tolerate no evil, no division between virtues and their opposites, and no breach between spirit and things material.⁴⁵ Zoroastrianism was a religion of moral considerations par excellence in which the techniques of transfiguration took the final form for Shii Islam of an esoteric knowledge of the Hidden Imam.⁴⁶

It is not difficult to perceive in Twelver Imami Shiism the ethical and cultural legacy of Zoroastrianism, nor in the person of Khomeini an emanation of the Zoroastrian savior transmuted into a holy imam-prophet. Zoroastrian and Twelver Shii Islamic ethics both

apotheosize justice and make it the moral imperative, without the attainment of which there can be no salvation in history. For man to comprehend the significance of justice for salvation in both religions, prophecy is needed because man's corruption disbars him from legislating rationally in his own behalf. Although Khomeini never claimed for himself such a role—in Shiism that would be tantamount to the heresy of proclaiming oneself the Hidden Imam returned—nevertheless he acted as if he were indeed the savior of all Muslims.

Khomeini's view of the place which the state occupies in the international order is closely modeled on this eschatological interpretation of Shii history and the fulfillment of the law as its driving force. Khomeini constructed an international order of three state systems: the liberal, capitalist West; the atheistic, communist East; and the moral, divine Islamic system, neither East nor West. The first two systems may, as sovereign systems, be in competition with each other, but they are both antithetical to the Islamic third system because they represent political blocs whose ideological roots take nourishment not from the divine source of perfect justice, but from the satanic desire for lust and power.⁴⁷ Capitalism and communism both answer to Mammon; they must necessarily fail because, as quintessentially human ideologies, they recognize only the physical domination of man over man and his law over God's law.⁴⁸ The divine, universally valid moral law of Islam transcends the territorial and national limitations which an anthropocentric philosophy of history imposes on communism and capitalism. As Khomeini said: "The world is the homeland of humanity," by which he meant a spiritualized, triumphalist *Dar al-Islam*, the homeland of all true believers.⁴⁹

Thus defined, the international system is in a constant state of flux and conflict. To pursue *jihad* within such a system is to pursue the permanent revolutionary struggle for universal justice and freedom since only *jihad* can bring about the moral conditions lacking in Western positivistic international law. This message transparently clothes the classic Islamic argument for *jihad* in the modern garb of religio-political progressivism. But it does not otherwise disguise the falling together of the sacred and the profane which is the hallmark of religious cultures, such as Khomeini's, that have lacked historical control over their socio-economic and social environment.⁵⁰

Since Islam, in Khomeini's view, is the only state system based on the morality of divine law, it stands to reason that Islamic law, as an expression of the international order, is clearly superior to its Western counterpart. For if God requires man to defend the superiority of *sharia* through *jihad*, then the use of force to combat universal evil accords perfectly with the right of every nation to defend itself even under Article 51 of the United Nations' Constitution, for instance.⁵¹ And since every government acts as judge of its own cause, then the Islamic Republic of Iran, representing a step in the evolution of Islamic state system, has always fought defensive *jihads*. Thus the 8 years of war between Iran and Iraq can be seen as an attempt by the rebellious Baath polytheists of Iraq to destroy the evolving Islamic order. And because a contest between Muslim and non-Muslim nations cannot be arbitrated within the framework of Islamic law, a perpetual state of war is insured between Iran and her neighbor until Iraq accepts Khomeini's faith.⁵² The present cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq may be

observed for practical reasons. But even though the moral basis of Islamic law demands that, under the rules of *jihad*, all agreements be honored (*pacta sunt servanda*), it is inevitable that one day war will be resumed.⁵³ The universalism of Khomeinist Islamism, its ideological radicalism, and the absence of a specifically national Islamic territory in which it operates guarantee the exportation of revolution beyond the Iranian frontier. Yet, if the Iranian constitution forbids interference—except as self-defense—in the internal affairs of other countries, under what conditions can Khomeinist *jihad* foment revolution in the world? Can force be used short of war and be called, at the same time, *jihad*? Are subversion or terrorism permissible in *jihad*? The Iranian scholar R. K. Ramazani remarks that what Khomeini exported abroad was *jihad* in the form of proper Islamic “behavior.” His clerical diplomats propagated Islamic behavior guided by the directives of the Council of the Revolution in Tehran. Their activities were meant to safeguard the Islamic revolution at home.⁵⁴ The decision regarding the definition of Islamic “behavior,” however, was left to the practical clerical politicians in the field and often contravened the prescriptions of *sharia*.

Terrorism and *jihad*, for instance, are doctrinally contradictory. Terrorism has no religious basis in *sharia* but reacts to despair over civil circumstances. Terrorists, therefore, cannot be “mujahidun” (people involved in *jihad*).⁵⁵ Yet, in Lebanon where Islamic “behavior” has been recently transmogrified into an active ideological force, the Lebanese Shii Hizbollah party called its 1983 terrorist attack on the U.S. Marine compound a defensive *jihad* against an aggressive military enemy. It matters little whether *jihad* represents an offensive or defensive posture but whether such *jihad* makes a difference in the quality and character of an outward Islamic movement as it was destined to be.⁵⁶ Put into sociological terms, this means that the dogmatics of *jihad* are supposed to furnish answers to given situations. These dogmatics deal with functionally unanalyzed abstractions such as “justice,” “revolution,” “aggression,” and “defense” and thus are unreflective categories of thought incapable of “thematizing” social functions. They rest instead on the context-free availability of material, that is, on a distance from the connections dogmatics are supposed to interpret.⁵⁷ In the case of Hizbollah the group’s political aims have led to a moral ambiguity with respect to what the dogmatics of Shii *sharia* render permissible in the pursuit of defensive *jihad*. Terrorism, justified as a military operation against an enemy of the faith under the rules of *jihad*, was considered an aspect of self-defense. But the issue of suicide, abhorrent to Islamic sensibilities, was somewhat more difficult to justify.

In the final analysis, Lebanese Shii clerics might condone the terrorist attack by a suicide bomber on the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 on the grounds of extenuating circumstances, an argument not normally accepted in Islamic law. Sheikh Fadlallah, the head of the Lebanese Shii community and the “spiritual guide” of the Hizbollah at that time, reasoned that because of the imbalance of power between Hizbollah and the American forces and, furthermore, since defense of the Lebanese Shii *ummah* was mandatory under *jihad*, suicide was a commendable moral, if not necessarily licit, act. The Sheikh argued that suicide differs little from the death of a *mujahid* who knows he will be killed in the service of his cause. Only the circumstances are different. Thus if the act of suicide will have a political effect on the enemy it is therefore an act of *jihad*.⁵⁸

Fadlallah's reasoning not only demonstrates how flexible the Shii doctrine of *jihad* can be in fluctuating political situations but also underscores the psychological disposition under which the *mujahid* acts. In the Western mind suicide occurs in a state of mental derangement and moral disengagement. To the *mujahid* suicide sanctifies the act of "annihilating" oneself in God (*fana' billah*).⁵⁹ Since it was possible that the act of suicide could bring success against the enemy, then Fadlallah insisted that it was provisionally valid. This signifies that the legitimacy of suicide for *jihad* rests on the ends it attains but requires nonetheless a cleric to disengage the believer from his actions.⁶⁰

From this we see that the *mujahid's* sacrifice of his life in *jihad* makes him a martyr (*shahid*). In Shii theology the death of the martyr puts him on an equal footing with greatest of all Shii martyrs, the third Imam Hussein, as an intercessor for believers on the Day of Judgment.⁶¹ To take this conclusion a step further, martyrdom is not merely another more spiritualized aspect of *jihad*; it represents an alternative which remains after *jihad* because the martyr is able, by making *jihad* his "mission," to inspire those who follow him with revolutionary fervor.⁶²

It is possible to disengage from this a notion of the contemporary, radical Shii philosophy of history. Revolution may be defined as the resurrection of the *mujahid-shahid* in every generation to do battle against the people of *taghut* (Satan) so that God may revenge himself on evildoers. Because revolution can only lead to good, God has determined that man is the agent of goodness in history. Revolution is therefore not only man's obligation; it is his divine inheritance.⁶³

From the above it can be seen that these ideas conform neatly to Ayatollah Khomeini's radical Islamist view of the world. Khomeini did not distinguish defensive from offensive *jihad*. And what he called self-defense, he invariably defined as such himself. He acted in this manner because he was a "just" ruler who declared all forms of *jihad* legitimate in the name of defending God's chosen community.⁶⁴ So long as Khomeini interpreted God's *sharia* without error and applied it to the governance of the *ummah*, the possibility of *jihad* remained a constant given in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. The fundamental condition for waging *jihad* was the Ayatollah's rightly-guided intention to close the gap between believer and non-believer by "drawing the evil-doers nigh to God." Moral intention, especially in the execution of war, distinguishes in the ethos of Persian Zoroastrianism, in classical Shii Islam and in Khomeini's Islamist revision the praiseworthy from the damnable action.⁶⁵

Conclusions.

This chapter has demonstrated how Islam provides the basis for an Islamist concept of *jihad*. Historically *jihad* has never been a static concept. Adaptive and flexible, *jihad* has not only evolved to serve the needs of the Islamic imperium in regulating its international affairs with non-Muslim powers, it has furnished the context through which radical Islamist ideology is today attempting to transform Muslim socio-political values.

The radical Islamist message of *jihad* has been the subject of this study because Islamists alone purport to have a blueprint for the future prosperity of the Islamic Middle East. That blueprint makes it abundantly clear that the use of *jihad* is the *sine qua non* condition for the success of radical Islamist revolutionism.

Radical Islamism perceives in *jihad* a legal instrument for the militant revival of Islamic power. Radical Islamism does not accept the Western concept of war as a function of law. Therefore it cannot accept the legal equality of violence between belligerents. For radical Islamists war exists as a perpetual state of confrontation exclusive of hostilities because war is a religious duty which renders null and void the contractual conventions defining legal states of conflict. Treaties are temporary. The legal position of a Muslim state under such conditions is irrelevant because conflict defends religious principles, not national boundaries. In a word, war fought in the context of radical Islamist *jihad* is a concept totally independent of peace.⁶⁶

Khomeini's contribution to the Islamist concept of conflict was to raise *jihad* to the level of a universal moral crusade by reaffirming the connection between *jihad* and the Shii dogma of the Hidden Imam. Without the acceptance of the idea that conflict precedes the reappearance of a messianic personage—in this case, the Hidden Imam—*jihad* cannot constitute an article of faith. The Ayatollah Taleqani put it very well when he said that *jihad* can be imposed because its object is the defense of humanity from evil and its preparation for the good which signifies credence in *tawhid*, the doctrine of the unity of the Godhead. *Tawhid* is freedom in its purest form. Freedom is not only right; it is everyone's right. To understand what is one's right is to choose the right. Therefore nobody can act against what is right when it comes to salvation. And so it stands to reason that religion cannot be an issue of simple personal choice, nor can it be the extension into politics of the secular nation-state.⁶⁷ *Jihad* constitutes an integral part of religion. It is a form of worship that inheres in man's struggle for the good. In the broadest sense, *jihad* is transnational humanitarianism.⁶⁸

Jihad is obviously a device radical Islamists use to close the gap that the modern Middle Eastern secular state has opened between a theory and practice of governing Muslim peoples. The secular state has attempted to answer the Islamist challenge by modernizing *jihad* for its own purposes. It has been argued that only the secular state guarantees the rights of citizens to avoid sin, liberates them from oppression, and secures for them liberty.⁶⁹ *Jihad* recognizes the need for the state to encourage self-sufficiency in its arms industries and to prepare its armies for conflict through rigorous economic planning. Every citizen has the duty to prepare for this eventuality by contributing his energy, money, or physical strength to the commonwealth.⁷⁰ Faith in religion is a defense against the state's enemies. *Jihad*, then, is really self-instilled patriotism for the Muslim state. Hence, obedience to the state is not submission to arbitrary authority but a social necessity in the interest of the nation.⁷¹ This is a view that accords with the historical reality of the development of the Islamic imperium.

Because radical Islamists consider the secular state to be the perpetrator of unwanted social, economic and political transformations that threaten the survival of Islam, it

should not be surprising that *jihad* is the means radical Islamism has chosen to oppose it. This opposition is unfolding in a world in whose destiny the fate of Islam itself is nonetheless interwoven, a constantly shifting world that is a by-product of the universal empowerment to redefine state, nation, ethos, nationality and even religion. To ease the pain of change, radical Islamist *jihad* promotes a view of history that is both a therapy for the Muslim psyche and a compensation for the loss of Muslim status in world civilization. Furthermore, *jihad* is the preferred instrument whereby Islamists recast the character of Islamic religious culture in the face of what it perceives to be the bitter adversity of the West. In philosophical terms, *jihad* helps to keep God alive—in the words of the philosopher Emile Cioran—by constantly adding adjectives to his cause. In this way *jihad* aids in the process of mobilizing Muslims for political action.

Some of those adjectives are anti-secularist, revolutionary, anti-democratic, and maximalist. They are used by Islamists to demand individual responsibility for actions which would have otherwise been a collective duty, to reimpose Islamic law as the sole source of political legitimization for the morally corrupted state, to apply in a totalistic manner social strictures to women regarding abortion, sex, and birth control, and to maximalize Islamist political discourse with opponents.

This being said, the degree to which *jihad* is the justification for anti-state violence depends in part on the weight each radical Islamist movement gives *jihad* in its ideology. And the importance of the role that *jihad* plays in overall radical Islamist ideology may, in turn, be indexed against the historical experience of the impact of Westernism on the various Middle Eastern cultures. There are many versions of radical Islamism in the Middle East today. These versions are not all Shii. Neither do they all fit the Khomeinist view of the world, nor do they all support the goals of the Lebanese Hizbollah. Rather, they reflect the fact that there are as many *ummahs* as there exist cultures to which Islam was first preached. What Khomeinist Islamism has given to radical Islamism in general is a great sense of elan which reflects the particular constellation of Persia's Shiite culture and history, its interaction with the West and the personality and example of the Ayatollah himself. Because that particular constellation cannot be replicated everywhere, the theory and practice of Khomeinist *jihad* on which such an elan rests can likewise not be replicated. The theory and practice of radical Islamist *jihad* will fluctuate accordingly, and this fluctuation, paradoxically, will always threaten the unity of the *ummah* that radical Islamism is dedicated to preserve.

So if, on one hand, the crux of *jihad* resides in a definition of what constitutes legitimate conflict, it is clear that there is no one concept of *jihad* that applies monolithically to radical Islamism. If, on the other hand, the issue of *jihad* is merely a matter of expediency, that is, to justify the application of force to any political action that hastens the downfall of the secular state, then most Islamists will agree on its religious basis. It is the tension between the conceptual and the practical aspects of *jihad* that determines the scope of Islamist political action and no one cleric in the Muslim world—not even Khomeini—has succeeded in making the intellectual synthesis.

For the present moment radical Islamists use the ammunition of *jihad* against the target of the Middle East secular state. So long as radical Islamism targets the state, it may be politically tractable. When, however, *jihad* no longer serves the needs of the territorial defense or expansion of the various Muslim populations but is generalized as the radical Islamist's instrument of choice in the permanent ideological struggle between the civilization of the East and the West; when the collective duty to go on *jihad* which was a Muslim's obligation to the *ummah* as state or imperium yields to the universal duty of each individual Muslim to become an international revolutionary, then Islamism will be difficult for the West to combat. Nevertheless, to think that this will happen, that radical Islamism must by necessity spearhead this clash of civilizations across predetermined global fault lines is to accept the validity of the historical assumptions that have for centuries informed the process of Islamic religio-cultural mythmaking. An Islamic "veil" is not falling across the face of the earth. A resurgent Islamic empire is not about to replace the defunct Soviet imperium. To succumb to such thinking is to make the mistake of applying the theory of strategic implications—the domino theory—to circumstances in all respects distinct from those that sparked the Cold War from which the world is just now emerging.

ENDNOTES

1. See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.
2. "Djihad," *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Vol. 2, London: Luzac and Co., 1960, p. 538.
3. Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955, p. 57. In international law this is the difference between *bellum pium* and *bellum justum*.
4. Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, *Fundamentals of Islamic Thought: God, Man and the Universe*, ed., Hamid Algac, trans., R. Campbell, Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1985, p. 93.
5. Khadduri, p. 59.
6. Mustansir Mir, "Jihad in Islam," p. 115; and Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, "A Reassessment of Some Medieval and Modern Perceptions of the Counter-Crusades, p. 44, in *Jihad In Its Times*, ed., Hadia Dajani-Shakeel and Ronald A. Messier, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Center for Near East and North African Studies, Series No. 4.
7. As cited in Martin Kramer, *Political Islam*, The Washington Papers, No. 73, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1980, pp. 10-11.

8. Mahmud Taleqani and Murtaza Mutahhari, *Jihad and Shahadat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam*, ed., Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen, Houston: Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986, p. 12.

9. Majid Khadduri, trans., *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, p. 17. See also Mahmud Shaltut, "Koran and Fighting," in *Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam*, Rudolph Peters, trans., Leyden, Netherlands: Brill and Co., 1977, p. 45.

10. Shaltut, pp. 47-48.

11. Bassam Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, trans., Judith Von Sivers, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988, p. 144.

12. Mohamed Mokbel Elbakry, "Different Conceptions of *Jihad* and Its Relevance to Contemporary Trends of Islamic Movements," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1987, pp. 46-47.

13. Rudolph Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern Islam*, The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton, 1979, p. 133.

14. Tibi, p. 62.

15. Mir, p. 117.

16. Dajani-Shakeel, p. 45.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

18. Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, p. 34-35.

19. Khadduri, *The Islamic Law*, p.14.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

21. Khadduri, *War and Peace*, p. 60.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-72.

23. Regarding *jihad*, in the Mecca revelations, the term has consistently meant spiritual striving to attain nearness to God. (See 29:69, 19:6, and 29:8; also 22:78 and 25:52.) The term *jihad* or any of its derivatives, such as *jehada*, most Muslim scholars would argue, means nonviolent striving to be carried out primarily by means of the Quran, i.e., to argue and preach the word. The Quran permits Muslims to take up the

sword in self-defense in the Medina suras: i.e., the meaning of the term was expanded (9:73, 66:9), whereby fighting becomes legitimate in self-defense against nonbelievers.

24. Mir, p. 120; Taleqani and Mutahhari, pp. 12-13.

25. Tbi, p. 137.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 138; Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, p. 109.

27. Tibi, p. 87.

28. Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, p. 113.

29. In point of fact, the seeds of dissension, which eventually produced the basic split within the Muslim faith, were sewn much earlier, immediately upon the death of the Prophet. A companion of Muhammad, Abu Bakr, was chosen as his successor. The selection was contested by those who claimed that, in line with tribal practice, Muhammad's heir must be Ali, his closest male relative. Ali was passed over twice before he was finally chosen caliph. But then Mu'awiyah, the cousin of the third caliph, declared war on Ali, and it is in this contest—in which Ali was slain—that the Muslim community divided along the lines it has preserved until this day.

30. E. Kohlberg, "The Development of the Imami Shi's Doctrine of *Jihad*," *Zeitschrift der morgenlandischen Gesellschaft*, No. 126, 1976, p. 67. See also Amir Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran From the Beginning to 1890*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 33; and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *et al.*, eds., *Expectation of the Millennium: Shi'ism in History*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989, pp. 58, 93, 96.

31. Elbakry, pp. 50-51; Khadduri, *War and Peace*, p. 66.

32. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islamic Life and Thought*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1981, p. 195.

33. Arjomand, p. 62; Kohlberg, p. 69.

34. Arjomand, p. 62; Taleqani and Mutahhari, p. 18; Kohlberg, pp. 69, 74-75; Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, p. 10.

35. Taleqani and Mutahhari, p. 16.

36. Kohlberg, p. 81; Nasr, *et. al.*, *Expectation of the Millennium*, p. 59; Arjomand, p. 62.

37. Kohlberg, pp. 81, 83.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 84-86. See also Shaftut, p. 34-35.

39. Citing the contemporary scholar of Islam, Maxime Rodinson, in Tibi, p. 41.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

41. This view of Khomeini is developed in Farhang Rajaee, *Islamic Values and World View: Khomeyni on Man, State, and International Politics*, Vol. 13, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984.

42. Bruce Mazlish, a leading proponent of psychohistory, does so by dismissing Khomeini as abnormal in his "Hidden Khomeyni," *The New Yorker*, Vol. 24, December 1979.

43. The *coincidentia oppositorum* of Mircea Eliade. See his *A History of Religious Ideas: From the Stone Age to the Eleusinian Mysteries*, Vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 306-307, 310.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 313.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 316, 318.

47. Rajaee, p. 75.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79; Shaltut, p. 130.

49. Rajaee, p. 77.

50. Shaltut, p. 131; Tibi, p. 78.

51. R. K. Ramazani, "Shiism in the Persian Gulf," in *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, eds., Juan R. Cole and Nikkie R. Keddie, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986, p. 36.

52. Rajaee, pp. 90-91.

53. Shaltut, p. 144.

54. Ramazani, p. 37.

55. Elbakry, p. 64.

56. Mir, p. 124.

57. The sociologist Luhmann's formulation as cited by Tibi, p. 91.
58. Martin Kramer, *The Moral Logic of Hizbollah*, No. 101, Tel Aviv: The Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies of Tel Aviv University, 1987, p. 13.
59. On annihilation in God, see the Ayatollah Taleqani on *jihad* in Taleqani and Mutahhari, p. 68.
60. Kramer, *The Moral Logic of Hizbollah*, pp. 14-16, 22-23.
61. The Ayatollah Mutahhari on *shahid* in Taleqani and Mutahhari, pp. 128-129, 137.
62. Ali Shariati on *jihad*, *ibid.*, pp. 200, 207-208.
63. Shariati on *thawrah* (revolution), *ibid.*, pp. 258, 260-262.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
66. Elbakry, pp. 46-47, 57.
67. Taleqani and Mutahhari, p. 50.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
69. Korkut Ozal, *The Islamic Concept of Security*, London: Islamic Institute of Defence Technology, February 7, 1979, p. 6.
70. Maj. Gen. Mohamed Gamal al-Din Mahfouz, *Military Thought in Islam*, London: Islamic Institute of Defence Technology, February 7, 1979, pp. 3-4.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

CHAPTER 3

TERRORISM: HOW VULNERABLE IS THE UNITED STATES?

Stephen Sloan

Introduction.

If there is a “fog of war,” there is probably a more dense “smog of terrorism,” for the small nature of terrorist groups, their close interpersonal communications, and their predilection for soft targets of opportunity make it difficult to predict their future operations. Counterterrorism analysts must therefore peer through a very cloudy crystal ball when assessing the intentions, capabilities, and targets of existing and future terrorist groups. Life would be easier if, as when assessing a conventional army, analysts could pour over communications intercepts to discern orders of battle and make predictions based on the enemy’s known doctrine and strategy. The problem of penetrating the “smog of terrorism” is further exacerbated by the fact that it is difficult to infiltrate terrorist cells to acquire the tactical information needed to prevent, or at least to mitigate, a potential threat or actual incident. The most sophisticated capabilities in the arsenal of technical intelligence are no substitutes for the HUMINT (human intelligence) capabilities that are needed to gather information on terrorists. The problem of predictive analysis is further complicated by the fact that even if terrorist organizations have an encompassing ideology—or what is at best a proto-strategy—it tends to be rather general in nature and directed at establishing a broad declaration on revolutionary action that may not provide a clear plan for action that can enable the analyst to have a foundation for assessing future terrorist operations. Furthermore, predictive capabilities are challenged by the fact that there is a whole range of potential new terrorist weapons and associated scenarios for destruction that create major problems for those responsible for identifying a new generation of terrorist threats. There are those in the field who sometimes long for the “good old days” when a “terror network” guided by Moscow could be blamed for bombings, hostage-taking, skyjacking and other forms of mayhem.

Given these conditions, one faces an onerous task in attempting to assess how vulnerable the United States is to future threats and acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, such an assessment can prove useful if it can assist the analyst and those responsible for countering terrorism to look beyond the immediate threats or the latest incident. In their contingency driven, highly pressurized environment, analysts must concentrate on the collection and analysis of what is primarily tactical, combat or operational intelligence. They often lack the time to deal with strategic threats, to veer from the current requirements for narrowly focused, tactical intelligence.

What follows is a brief overview of the terrorist threat to the United States based on the application of strategic intelligence. This form of intelligence has a broader application than either operational or tactical intelligence, forms of information analysis dealing with immediate threats. Strategic intelligence integrates politics, social studies,

and the study of technology. It is designed to provide officials with long-range forecasts of what is important rather than what is urgent.¹

The Analytical Framework.

The analytical framework employed in this chapter will consist of the following components. The author will attempt to identify major changes in the international environment. He will then discuss how these changes create new terrorist threats in the United States. The author will then focus on probable technological/operational changes among terrorist groups. Finally, changes in terrorist motivations and goals will be examined. All of these components will then be analyzed in a strategic context to assess potential terrorist targets, operations, and resulting vulnerabilities within the United States.

The International Environment.

Even though it probably never fully existed, the artificial and superficial equilibrium imposed by the Cold War has been destroyed. Within the former republics of the defunct Soviet Union the order imposed by Moscow on ethnic and nationalist movements has given way to separatists' demands often accompanied by political violence including terrorism, various forms of low intensity conflict, rapidly growing organized crime, and civil war. The instability has spilled over into Eastern Europe where the former satellites are attempting to cope with the uncertainties of democratization. Additionally, now that Moscow and Washington are no longer inclined to use regional surrogates as a way of avoiding direct confrontation, a number of regional powers are emerging. Neither Moscow nor Washington have either the inclination or the influence needed to constrain many of these regional would-be superpowers. Iran is a case in point. Countries like Iran, Syria and Libya use terrorism as a form of diplomacy and as an adjunct to their foreign policies.² To these states, terrorism is as integral a part of their diplomacy as the exchange of ambassadors. Smaller states can easily emulate their example.

In this era of what should be called a "new world disorder," the breakdown of central authority and the domination of the existing state system has been under assault from a number of quarters. First, the legitimacy of many states has been challenged by the growing assertion of both sub-national and transnational calls for "self-determination" by ethnic groups and religious movements that deny the legitimacy of what they perceive to be a discredited international order. Despite the optimism of the past, primordial loyalties have not withered away in the face of technology, democracy, and the introduction of free market economies. Indeed, many groups and movements have fed upon a reaction to what is sometimes viewed as the secular immorality of the West. Tribal loyalties on a sub-national level share the rejection of secular mass societies with fundamentalist movements. Some of these movements seem to offer the chimera of psychological, sociological and political security to people who are trying to find their place in an uncertain, even threatening, world.

New and dangerous players have emerged in the international arena. The level of instability and concomitant violence is further heightened by the rise to international political significance of non-state actors willing to challenge the primacy of the state. Whether it be the multinational corporation or a terrorist group that targets it, both share a common characteristic. They have each rejected the state-centric system that emerged 175 years ago at the Congress of Vienna.

All of these factors have accelerated the erosion of the monopoly of the coercive power of the state as the disintegration of the old order is intensified. And, this process will in all probability gain even greater momentum because of the wide ranging and growing activities of criminal enterprises. These include everything from arms traders and drug cartels, which will provide and use existing and new weapons in terrorist campaigns as a part of their pursuit of profit and political power.

In sum, present and future terrorists and their supporters are acquiring the capabilities and freedom of action to operate in the new international jungle. They move in what has been called the “gray areas,” those regions where control has shifted from legitimate governments to new half-political, half-criminal powers.³ In this environment the line between state and rogue state, and rogue state and criminal enterprise will be increasingly blurred. Each will seek out new and profitable targets through terrorism in an international order that is already under assault.

Technological/Operational Changes.

The remarkable changes in the international environment have been accompanied by technological changes that may have serious ramifications as regards future terrorist operations both internationally and in the United States. Up to now, terrorists have not been especially innovative in their tactics. Bombing, although not on the intended magnitude of that at the Oklahoma City Federal Building, remains the most common type of attack. Hostage taking and kidnapping are fundamental to the terrorist repertoire and skyjacking is always a possibility. Automatic and semi-automatic rifles and pistols remain the weapons of choice. However, the employment of stand-off weapons like American Stinger and Russian SA-7 hand-held anti-aircraft missiles, the U.S. Army M-72 light anti-tank weapon (LAW), and the Russian-built RPG-7 anti-tank weapon may be more readily available to terrorists than many like to believe. The same may be said of terrorist bombing technologies. Dynamite has been replaced by the more destructive and easily concealed Semtex. Furthermore, the threat has grown as a result of increased technological sophistication of timing devices and fuses. But weapons need not be sophisticated to be destructive. One only has to consider what might have happened if the pilot of the lone single-engine light aircraft which crashed into the White House had filled his plane with something as simple as a fertilizer bomb. That incident, even if it was not a terrorist act, should serve as a warning for those who are concerned with more advanced technological threats. They should remember that smaller and more conventional instruments of destruction are still quite lethal and can have a profound effect on the targeted individual, corporation, government or what is often the ultimate target: public opinion.

A growing concern is that terrorists will cross the threshold to engage in acts of mass or “super terrorism” by using atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons. So far, the international order has been spared terrorist incidents involving nuclear weapons. Indeed, those that have been reported have turned out to be elaborate hoaxes. Fortunately, the threats have yet to be translated into actual incidents, but many believe it is only a matter of time before they are.⁴

All this could easily change as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The current trade in illicit weapons grade plutonium serves to underscore the fact that the necessary material and attendant technology will be increasingly available for those terrorist groups who may want to exercise a nuclear option, be it in the form of a dispersal of radioactive material that could contaminate a large area or the use of a relatively small but very lethal atomic weapon. The illegal trade in weapons and technology will be further exacerbated by the very real dangers resulting from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is good reason to fear that either a rogue state, its terrorist surrogates, or independent terrorist groups will have the capacity to go nuclear. Whether this threshold will be crossed will depend in part on the motivation, attendant strategies, and goals of present and future terrorist groups. In sum, there is every reason to be concerned that terrorists will engage in their own form of technical innovation to develop the capacity to make the nightmare of a nuclear, chemical, or biological threat move from the pages of an adventure novel to the shores of the United States.

Scenarios addressing future acts of high-tech terrorism include a wide variety of assaults on the delicate interdependent infrastructure of modern industrialized society. These scenarios move beyond the bombing or seizing of conventional or nuclear power plants to include the potentially disastrous destruction of the technological infrastructure of the information super highway. However, the scope of what constitutes a terrorist act on computers and their associated facilities is subject to interpretation. The bombing of a multinational corporation or a government’s crucial computer centers could be judged an act of terrorism, but what if a terrorist hacker placed a computer virus in a very sensitive network? The results could range from the massively inconvenient to dangerous or disastrous. Such an act, however, would lack an essential element of terrorism as it is now defined: the use or threat of the use of physical violence. Nevertheless, as the technology expands so may definitions of what constitutes a terrorist act. From the terrorist’s point of view the following dictum may apply, “so many new targets . . . so little time.”

Finally, if indeed terrorism is “theater” and the people are the audience, the stage is changing.⁵ CNN and other networks provide the terrorists with a potential and almost instantaneous means for spreading their message of fear and intimidation. The reality of video proliferation is just as significant as that of nuclear proliferation. Some terrorist groups already have the ability to stage and videotape their acts, sending them out to either a broad or limited audience. They can even transmit live events through low power transmitter stations. Furthermore, the next generation of terrorists may produce highly imaginative presentations to seize the attention of a violence-jaded public, one which has

grown used to the now standard images of hooded terrorists holding hostages in embassies, prisons, or aircraft cabins. This kind of theater of the obscene will find a ready mass audience among those who watch the tabloid television shows and depend on the *National Inquirer* for their news.⁶ Given the public's fascination with television happenings like the O.J. Simpson trial, one can only imagine what might happen if future terrorists direct and produce their own television spectacles.

Changes in Terrorist Motivations and Goals.

There are almost certainly going to be changes in both the motivation and goals of terrorist groups. The traditional motivations for terrorism: ethnic, tribal, and religious animosities, will continue and intensify. Even while people of goodwill struggle to find solutions to problems in Northern Ireland and in the Middle East, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and the related turmoil in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere have engendered new groups pursuing their own varied agendas through violence, including terrorism. While much of the violence is confined to the various regions, the potential for involving surrounding states and for international assaults is significant. Even in the Middle East, where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel are moving along a tortuous road toward accommodation, various factions, willing and able to engage in non-territorial terrorism, will continue to "bring the war home" to Israel and its primary supporter, the United States.

Perhaps even more ominous is the growing significance of apolitical groups which resort to terrorism in pursuit of financial gain as a part of criminal enterprises. While a number of these groups may, in part, justify their actions under the rubric of political rationalization, their major goal will relate to maximizing their profits through co-opting, corrupting, and neutralizing the authority of the states in their respective countries and regions of operations. These groups, which include narco-terrorists, are particularly difficult to counteract given their vast resources gleaned by illicit trade in drugs or weapons, and because of their ability to influence, control or demoralize governments in countries where they operate. This new criminal order can engage in operations with the kind of violence that makes the old Mafia seem pacifistic by comparison.

Finally, one might anticipate that in addition to existing extremists operating according to issue-oriented movements such as radical environmentalism, fringe elements of the pro-life movement, and extremist animal rights groups, there will emerge new groups willing to use terrorism to avenge grievances both real and imaginary. These groups, which at the outset may be small and not tied to any recognized social or political movement, may have the capability to maximize their impact through the availability of a wide variety of weapons, a rich selection of targets, and the skillful use of the media and communications technology. There will be both old and new adversaries to threaten the international order and, more specifically, U.S. interests and citizens both at home and abroad.

How Vulnerable is the United States and What Are the Terrorists Goals?

The following assessment is based on integrating the analytical components presented above. The focus will be on the vulnerabilities in the United States to attacks by international terrorist or domestic groups or by such groups with domestic-international linkages.

The new threat environment may see the emergence of a wide variety of sub-national and transnational groups intent on venting their frustrations with Washington for what they perceive to be a lack of support for their causes or, conversely, for supporting their adversaries. As the major military superpower, with an increased global involvement, even when engaged under the United Nations, the United States is likely to be viewed as the primary party in future disputes. Even when neutral, Washington is likely to be viewed suspiciously by one or more warring factions. In addition, when Washington moves beyond “peace keeping” to “peace enforcement” operations, the likelihood of a reaction among one or more disputants is possible. Even though the United States may not want to be the policeman or the conscience of the world, the parties in any conflict may question whether Washington is intentionally or unintentionally pursuing a political agenda that may be counter to their objective. The result might be the spillover of violence to the United States by one or more parties in the dispute. Resort to terrorism could be a punitive action or it might be an effort to dramatize a cause. As the United States tries to redefine the formulation and execution of its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, even if Washington is motivated by the highest of ideals, i.e., democratization, humanitarian assistance, or nation-building, those who will be the objects of such efforts might resent it. Their use of terrorism on American soil is a likely response.

The potential spillover effect may be intensified by the domestic political and economic environment. The potency of ethnic-based politics, coupled with the tendentious debates over immigration policy, may provide fertile ground by which ethnic-based conflicts from overseas may be transported to the United States. Even if that is not the case, the existence of large immigrant communities may provide the “human jungle” in which external terrorist groups can operate. The emergence of a variety of issue-oriented transnational groups could also lead extremists within their respective organizations to establish linkages with like-minded individuals or groups within the United States. Such groups could undertake joint operations against American targets in an effort to dramatize their causes or seek changes in public policy. Cooperation between home-grown terrorists and their foreign counterparts cannot be understated. In an increasingly interrelated international environment, a new “terror network” might emerge with issue-oriented groups launching assaults on domestic targets.

The threat posed by fundamentalist religious groups of all faiths cannot be discounted. Not only Islamic extremists, but other “true believers” of a variety of faiths are likely to engage in terrorist acts against American targets. These groups might be supported or joined in their operations by domestic religious extremists. In addition, they might also seek alliances with a variety of cultists, survivalists, or neo-fascists who, for

their own reasons, reject the existing social, economic, and political order and await their own versions of Armageddon.

Perhaps even more dangerous will be the resort to terrorism by apolitical terrorists who are engaged in violence and intimidation as a part of criminal pursuits. Such groups have operated overseas with impunity. Inner city America could become a fertile ground for their operations. They will be particularly threatening since, as a result of their illegal trade in drugs and other criminal enterprises, they may have access to vast funds with which to corrupt local authorities. What will make these groups especially dangerous may be the fact that their threats and acts of terrorism will not necessarily be meant to achieve publicity or to dramatize their cause.

Such groups may use terrorist tactics in extortion attempts like those used to “shake down the neighborhood”—only these gangs may attempt to blackmail the entire city. With their vast revenues, they could acquire a formidable arsenal of weapons with which to challenge local authorities and carry out their acts of violence on a scale not yet experienced in the United States. Furthermore, it may be very difficult for our already strained criminal justice system to address the development of new criminal cartels.

The scope and magnitude of future potential terrorist organizations will be enhanced by the rapid changes in technology that will provide the next generation of terrorists with capabilities undreamed of by the most highly dedicated and skilled terrorist of today. In a sense the capture of the infamous Carlos marked the end of an era. A new generation of terrorists armed with technologically advanced weaponry will be able to engage in violence that is more dramatic and destructive than that intended in the bombing in Oklahoma City. The threat at the lower end of the spectrum is likely to grow as well. The M-16, M-10, Uzi and AK-47 assault rifles will be supplemented by stand-off weapons like Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, LAWs and RPG-7s, already available on the world weapons market. Just because a weapon is relatively unsophisticated does not mean it cannot cause massive casualties. A stinger missile aimed at a jumbo jet as it takes off or as it approaches a large metropolitan airport could cause tremendous casualties. A LAW or RPG round lobbed into the right area of a nuclear power plant could produce catastrophic consequences.

Ultimately, the most fearful and recurrent terrorist nightmare may be drawing closer to reality. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated technologies, and the diffusion of knowledge needed to manufacture chemical and biological weapons, raises the fearful specter of mass destruction that makes concerns related to use of anthrax as a way of spreading both disease and panic pale to insignificance. The scary truth is that the United States is all too vulnerable to this kind of attack. The porous borders that have allowed massive illegal immigration are just as open to those who want to import new instruments of mass destruction. And, because there are significant profits to be made, there are suppliers who are willing to provide the new generation of portable nuclear weapons, chemical and biological delivery systems despite Washington’s growing concern and the improving technical means to counter such threats. Furthermore, the next generation of terrorists will have the capability of effectively exploiting the highly

competitive electronic and print media both to dramatize their conventional or ABC capabilities and to extort money.

Technological changes will certainly have an impact on target selection. At the outset, the availability of more sophisticated conventional explosives could enable terrorists to inflict greater damage on potential targets while lessening the risk of capture that results from having to process or transport the material. Highly symbolic targets like government buildings and corporate headquarters will be more vulnerable to attack. Major public events, like the Super Bowl or the 1996 Atlanta Olympics are also prime targets.

Despite more effective physical security and technological countermeasures it will be increasingly difficult to harden potential targets. Even if the range of the weapons is relatively short, it will be a considerable challenge to expand an anti-terrorist security zone beyond the immediate periphery of potential targets like sports facilities, government buildings, or nuclear power plants. Defense in depth will require broader protective measures.

Even of greater concern is the potential threat of such weapons to aviation security. While anti-skyjacking measures have been largely successful in the industrialized West, the possibility of the threat or the destruction of commercial aircraft cannot be dismissed. It is exceedingly difficult to expand a security zone beyond the confines of an airport. Moreover, stand-off weapons provide the opportunity for highly flexible hit and run attacks. The resulting mobility will make it very difficult to predict or take appropriate action against terrorists. Finally, as potential targets continue to be hardened in urban areas, there is no reason to believe that terrorists will not seek softer targets of opportunity either in the suburbs (corporate headquarters) or rural areas (nuclear or thermal power plants and other installations). Despite these threats, it will remain difficult to develop the necessary awareness, technology and training among those corporations outside urban areas. Too many people may not take the threat seriously enough due to an "it can't happen here" syndrome.

Most ominous, however, is the threat issuing from mass or super-terrorism. Cities may be held hostage by threats to poison the water supply or to disseminate any number of dangerous chemical or biological agents. Such threats must also be taken seriously given the proliferation of ABC capabilities. The threat might be overt, in which case the authorities will have the onerous task of reconciling the need to take appropriate action without creating a panic. Or the threat might be covert, in which case governments will be facing a form of nuclear, chemical, or biological blackmail unknown to the public. Finally, one can anticipate that there will be more incidents of criminal terrorism directed against senior executives, public officials, and their families. The terrorists will justify such acts of hostage-taking and kidnapping on the basis of political causation, but in many cases they will be motivated by nothing more than a desire for ransom money. There is no reason to believe that criminal extortion, which has become a major industry in Mexico and throughout Central and South America, will not be emulated within the

United States. In sum, the constellation of potential targets and the means to attack them will continue to expand in the coming decade.

The traditional motivation behind the resort to terrorism by various groups is sure to continue. Ethnic identification and hatred, the call to right perceived wrongs, and the demand for self-determination will continue to inspire terrorists. The ranks of the traditional terror mongers will be joined by religious extremist groups who have rejected what they view to be the excesses of Western and American secular society. These forces of reaction may come from the Middle East, but there will be the non-Islamic equivalents of the Hamas and Hizbollah venting their anger and demanding the destruction of the “Great Satan.” These true believers, in the conduct of what they view to be a “just war,” may attack the symbols of their religious or secular rivals. Acts such as the bombings of the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires might be emulated in Washington or New York. Moreover, domestic groups acting either independently or with the support of external terrorist organizations may launch their own assaults. One need only recall how a sectarian dispute within the United States was transformed into a mass hostage taking by the Hanafi Muslims in Washington, DC in 1977. The most alarming aspect of the religious extremists is the fact that they do not necessarily constrain their actions by using terror as a weapon to coerce or to propagandize for their causes. The new true believer, armed with the certainty of faith, may not be concerned with current public opinion or a change in the policy of an adversary. To them, being killed while undertaking an act of terrorism may be a way to paradise in the next life. The image of the smiling truck bomber driving his vehicle into the Marine barracks in Beirut may be duplicated in a large urban center in the United States. And the nightmare only becomes more horrific if such a perpetrator uses a nuclear device. While one does not want to overstate the threat, the strategic thinker must be willing to “think the unthinkable” so that appropriate responses may be conceived.

The panoply of potential attacks, save for the nuclear option or other forms of super-terrorism, will probably not create a major change in U.S. foreign policy or the articulation and pursuit of U.S. strategic interests and national security objectives. However, in this new world disorder terrorism may come to the United States whenever foreign adversaries want to test Washington’s resolve in continuing its support for activities of the United Nations and friendly governments. Given the lack of coherence in the international environment and the low threshold of pain in regard to the taking of American casualties in ill-defined conflicts and the emergence of neo-isolationism, one must recognize that future acts of terrorism, if skillfully executed, might have a strategic result. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut changed the course of U.S. policy toward Lebanon. That kind of act could be duplicated in the United States with even more dramatic results.

Conclusion.

As noted at the start of this chapter, it is difficult to see through the smog of terrorism to *assess* America’s vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it is dangerous to either understate or overstate the threat. If one minimizes the threat, little action may be taken. If one

overstates it, the public and the authorities might overreact. What is needed is a realistic assessment which avoids both extremes. While recognizing that there is a threat, but not overemphasizing it, appropriate measures can be taken to lessen the likelihood of an attack. Moreover, a balanced and cautious view can assist both the public and policymakers in developing a consistent level of anti-terrorism awareness and countermeasures. Constant awareness and preparedness are fundamental to deterring terrorists. Such a prudent approach is far better than the overreaction that might occur after an incident. In the final analysis, the United States is vulnerable to the changing terrorist threat. But the threat can be met through heightened levels of awareness, resolve, counterterrorism measures, and consistent policies.⁷

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER 4

TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY: TERRORISM AND THE PRICE OF GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

Steven Metz

Introduction.

The contemporary world is one of rapid and extensive flows, whether electronic flows of information and communication, or physical flows of goods, services, and people. Seamlessness is a defining feature of the late-20th century; the result is an erosion of the distinction between foreign policy and domestic conditions. This is especially true for the United States where deliberate choices have amplified the connection between the world and the nation. In his foreign policy, President Clinton has continued a 50-year tradition of global engagement, the goal to expand the community of free market democracies.¹ However sound, this approach has unintended costs, sometimes violent ones. As the world's dominant power, the United States is seen as a bulwark of the status quo. Opponents of the status quo—the repressed, dispossessed, and disgruntled—often consider the United States a natural enemy. Hostility is thus part of the price of global engagement.

The relationship is actually circular: just as American actions abroad have domestic repercussions, domestic public opinion shapes foreign policy and national security strategy. The starkest venue for this relationship is terrorism on U.S. soil. Admittedly, not all terrorism within the United States is performed by foreigners. Most is not. Still, a fringe group of those dissatisfied with American foreign policy could at any time strike targets in the United States. Today, this is becoming increasingly easy. With the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, terrorism, according to Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman, “had come home to America. We Americans, frequently the target of terrorists abroad, were no longer safe, even on our own soil.”²

The World Trade Center bombing may offer a glimpse of the future, serving as the first skirmish in a campaign of violence within the United States. Increasingly, American policymakers must consider whether their decisions will spark terrorism. Terrorism at home could debilitate U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy, thus destroying any chance of constructing a more positive and prosperous global system. Having won the Cold War, the United States could lose the peace to a handful of violent extremists. Only determined political leadership can prevent this.

Effects.

Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.³ It has existed for millennia, but first had a major effect on

American foreign policy in the 1970s. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, several Palestinian groups launched or escalated terror campaigns just as the United States became Israel's foremost arms supplier. This coincidence enmeshed the United States in the war against international terrorism. Active support from the Soviet Union and its clients in training, equipping, and aiding terrorist movements of all kinds heightened the problem. By the early 1980s, conflict in Lebanon and the Gulf as well as support for Egypt forced the United States even deeper into the dark struggle. Elsewhere, the violently disgruntled drew inspiration from the Middle East and from earlier terrorism in Vietnam. Counterinsurgency campaigns in the Philippines and El Salvador led to American deaths, as did support for the governments of several NATO allies facing their own terrorist challenges.

As terrorism swept the world, some experts expected an active home front in the United States, but it never emerged. This was due, in part, to the vigilance of U.S. security agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation.⁴ The difficulty terrorists faced operating in American culture was also an obstacle. But now this may be changing. The United States is much less alien to Third World nationals, whether from the Middle East or elsewhere, than 20 years ago. Members of almost every culture can find hospitable corners in major American cities. Nations such as Iran and Syria have at least partially compensated for the collapse of the Soviet-led support network.⁵ And, to a large extent, global terrorism has matured to the point where external sponsors are less crucial. No connections have been established, for instance, between the World Trade Center bombers and a foreign government.⁶ This suggests those experts who predicted the opening of a terrorist "home front" in the 1970s were not wrong, but simply premature. There is currently no concerted campaign of international terrorism directed at targets within the United States, but there could be in the future.

At this point, it is not clear what impact widespread terrorism at home would have on American public opinion and foreign policy. It is possible, though, to delineate a range of feasible reactions. First, it might create public pressure for American disengagement from conflict-prone regions or from the Third World in general. Making the public conclude that global engagement is not worth the cost is precisely the outcome terrorists seek. And, unfortunately, total disengagement might be the only true palliative. The recent history of the Middle East suggests it is less the actual content of American policy that provokes terrorism than the extent of U.S. involvement. What the United States saw as pro-Arab positions were just as likely to spark political violence as explicitly pro-Israel stands. Framing a more "balanced" U.S. foreign policy or paying greater attention to the "legitimate grievances" of groups that terrorists claim to represent may not diminish terrorism.

Terrorist acts on U.S. soil could also have the exact opposite effect on American public opinion. Rather than opting for disengagement, terrorism could enrage Americans and generate pressure for a more aggressive policy toward international supporters of terrorism or its sympathizers. Media coverage of the agony of terrorism's victims might lead to calls to punish states proven to have supported the terrorists (or even suspected of doing so). Rather than deterring American involvement, something like the bombing of

the Marine barracks in Beirut could inflame passions as did the destruction of the *Maine* or the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

Terrorism associated with foreign states or political movements is almost certain to exacerbate hostility against groups associated with them. This is especially true if it were connected to the Middle East in some way. If this happened, American Muslims would be particularly vulnerable to guilt by association. Even though Islam is one of the fastest growing religions in the United States, it is poorly understood. The appearance of self-professed Islamic terrorists during the past two decades has created fear and distrust.⁷ Terrorist attacks by those claiming to act on behalf of Islam—even when condemned by the majority of Muslims—will provoke anti-Islamic feelings in the United States.

Potentially, this could increase the influence of violent nativist movements like skinheads and neo-Nazis.

Since modern terrorists pay little attention to national borders when choosing targets and techniques, attacks within the United States are likely to speed the melding of traditional military functions with traditional law enforcement activities. In fact, writers such as Donald J. Hanle contend that international terrorism must be considered a form of warfare.⁸ To some extent, the American approach to terrorism already blends military and law enforcement functions. The Department of Defense, Department of Justice, State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency all play some role in countering international terrorism.⁹ If terrorists become more high-tech, either by targeting the U.S. communications network or by using chemical, biological, or nuclear devices, and do open an active front within the United States, the integration of domestic and international security services may accelerate.

In general, terrorists use and manipulate the open press, legal protection of privacy, and rights of due process and public trial.¹⁰ They deliberately force democracies to either accept their ravages or surrender some of the rights which define open political systems.

This poses an extraordinarily difficult problem for democracies.¹¹ Nations facing serious terrorist threats have often been forced to alter their structures of civil and legal rights in order to combat the problem. The United Kingdom is one example. While treating terrorism as a species of crime, the Prevention of Terrorism legislation gives the government wide-ranging prerogatives including the banning of certain organizations, the right to stop any person or vehicle in Northern Ireland, and special powers to attack terrorist finances and perform investigations.¹² Abnormal abrogations of civil liberties have thus become the norm, not only in Britain, but throughout Western Europe. If faced with a significant terrorist challenge on home soil, the United States might be forced to follow the same path.

The Role of Leadership.

What, then, is the solution? Ironically, the onset of serious terrorism within the United States would provide a golden opportunity for American political leaders.

Terrorism's pain and tragedy would arouse emotions, but not dictate appropriate responses. Political leaders could thus harness the energy of public passion and use it

any number of ways, constructively or destructively. This means the form and quality of political leadership will determine which of the possible effects of domestic terrorism come to fruition.

Initially, policymakers would see more dilemmas than opportunities in a terrorist assault. For example, political leaders attempting to deal with widespread terrorism will be struck by the inadvertent symbiosis between the terrorists and the media.¹³ Terrorists want and need publicity. Because dramatic terrorism draws audiences, the media focus on it, thus providing inducements for further terrorism. For political leaders, this creates a conflict between their constitutional mandate to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare” and the constitutional prohibition on laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” So long as the media will not admit they provide precisely the publicity terrorists seek and assume no responsibility beyond “providing the public what it wants,” there will be no solution to this problem. The endless, melodramatic coverage of the terror bombing of April 19, 1995, in Oklahoma City suggests the American media are far from understanding this.

Another dilemma that may also confound American leaders is that terrorism is a form of conflict where one failure obviates a string of successes. In fact, the public often may not know of counterterrorist victories since protection of sources and methods will require silence. Officials cannot publicize informers, agents, or cooperation from friendly governments without risking future activities. But one failure opens the government to criticism and a handful of failures will generate an image of crisis. The government may thus know it is winning the war on terrorism while appearing to lose. Losing will always be hot news, winning will not.

Faced with these dilemmas, the only reasonable option will be a complex balance between too much concern for terrorism and too little. There is probably no more difficult task for leaders in a communication-rich and fluid democracy than creating and sustaining tolerance for low-intensity conflict, particularly when the payoffs are abstract—world order and the like—rather than tangible. Yet that is what American political leaders must do. In the minds of the public, terrorism must be relegated to irrelevancy lest foreign policy and national security strategy become paralyzed. Obsession will be disastrous. The major difficulty, though, is overcoming the natural human tendency to focus on dramatic failures rather than on more mundane successes. Conflicts that break out despite American efforts are always more newsworthy than those deterred. The same holds for terrorist attacks.

If terrorism escalates, it will be difficult to convince the public that global engagement is worth the price. So far, the Clinton administration has made a concerted effort to do so. The need for global American leadership has been a common theme in statements by the President and his top advisers.¹⁴ This must continue. American political leaders must also make the public understand that *partial* disengagement would not end the terrorist threat. In fact, the failure of the United States to act in a foreign crisis is almost as likely to provoke anti-American violence as acting itself. Americans must realize that in many parts of the world, people sincerely believe that the United

States could solve all their problems if Washington wished to. The appearance of disdain or unconcern infuriates the repressed and dispossessed. It also leads them to conclude that if they could only inspire and motivate the United States, things would change.

Phrased differently, not all terrorists seek to *deter* American action, many aim to *provoke* it. This means the only way the United States could remove itself from the list of terrorist targets is to fully abdicate superpower status. In some parts of the world and for some types of conflict, disengagement is wise.¹⁵ It will not, however, end terrorism. The adverse effects of fully abdicating superpower status are so stark that if the public understood this choice, pressure for disengagement would diminish.

By the same token, American political leaders must not allow terrorism to stoke enmity among Americans. In particular, care must be taken to quash anti-Islamism that may grow from terrorist attacks. Even though Federal officials said there was no connection between the bombing in Oklahoma City and people of Muslim faith, an Iraqi refugee family was assaulted and early speculation that the attack was the work of Middle Eastern terrorists led to bitter criticism from the Arab world.¹⁶ Such antagonism will escalate if terrorism grows. So far, American political leaders have done little to correct public misunderstanding of Islam and the apparent fear that arises from it. The entertainment industry, particularly its low-brow segment, has made the situation worse by frequent use of a stereotype Arab terrorist, again under the guise of “giving the public what it wants.” A concerted educational program to provide a more balanced assessment is past due. Iman Plemon T. El-Amin has written, “The voices of peace, justice, mercy, and tolerance are not difficult to find among Muslims and Islamic media, who consistently denounce acts of terrorism and reject them as illegitimate and unacceptable Islamic strategies or methods.”¹⁷ The American government must help make this known.

Punishment of external sponsors of terrorism has long been an element of U.S. policy. This may need further amplification. Serious consideration should be given to considering sponsorship of terrorism an act of war (particularly attacks using weapons of mass destruction). The combination of economic sanctions, political pressure, and punitive military strikes has not fully deterred the more diehard friends of terrorism like Iran and Syria. The possibility that sponsorship will lead to an American declaration of war might. Since this would require a clear “smoking gun,” the U.S. intelligence community will play a vital role. In fact, countering terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be the top priorities of post-Cold War U.S. intelligence efforts. These are difficult steps which again require determined political leadership.

The Oklahoma City bombing suggests that most of the terrorism faced by the United States in the near future will be home-grown. There is the potential, though, that U.S. foreign policy will provoke terrorist attacks from foreign-backed groups. If this happens, the United States is not ready. The World Trade Center bombing, according to Congresswoman Olympia J. Snowe, showed “that the U.S. Government remains psychologically, and in some cases, legislatively unprepared to cope with the arrival of international terrorism on American shores.”¹⁸ In response, President Clinton sent a

tough new counterterrorism bill to Congress in February 1995. This was designed to clarify criminal jurisdiction for terrorist acts on U.S. soil and prevent fund-raising in the United States by organizations that support international terrorism.¹⁹ Following the Oklahoma City bombing, the President created a new domestic counterterrorism center and sought authority for Federal agents to monitor the telephones calls and check the credit, hotel and travel records of suspected terrorists.²⁰ Civil liberties activists immediately opposed these steps, thus reopening what could become an intense debate over the degree to which laws and procedures should be adapted to confront terrorism.²¹

Even if the President's actions gain approval, further psychological preparation and political action is required. Americans have grown accustomed to some of the costs of global engagement. Money and military casualties have been deemed acceptable burdens of world leadership, but Americans are not yet used to the idea that terrorism at home may be an additional cost of global engagement. Unfortunately, terrorists understand this. In the near future, they are likely to use this vulnerability and the growing multiculturalism of the United States in attempts to either deter U.S. activity or provoke it. Only wise and persistent leadership, exercised *before* terrorism at home reaches crisis proportions, can prevent it from paralyzing American involvement in world affairs.

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